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ABSTRACT
JOHN DEWEY: A FEMINIST CONSIDERATION OF HIS CONCEPTS OF
THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIALITY
MAY 1992
ANA M. MARTINEZ ALEMAN, B.A., STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW
YORK AT BINGHAMTON
M.A., STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT BINGHAMTON
Ed.D. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Johnstone Campbell

This dissertation considers selected aspects of John Dewey's
educational philosophy from a feminist perspective. As inquiry, it is a
critical consideration of an established educational tradition. Most
importantly, this inquiry suggests that through consideration, we may
find relevant wisdom for our feminist educational theories and
practices. The focus of this dissertation are John Dewey's concepts of
the individual and sociality. Because both John Dewey's and feminist
educational treatises are experience-centered, the consideration of
the notions of the individual and of sociality is prudent. Through an
examination of Dewey's construction of the individual and sociality, we
are able to consider whether or not we can we apply Dewey's
revisionist philosophy to our personal, political and social worlds. Do
Dewey's concepts of the individual and the social have the
characteristic connectedness that many feminists require? Do his
conceptualizations of the individual and the social have anything of
value for feminist agendas? Are feminist goals for the individual and
sociality possible through a Deweyan conceptualization? Can Dewey’s
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individual and sociality help fuel the feminist revolution? Concluding
observations present the dangers of neglecting to consider past
educational thought, feminist educational theorists' responsibilities,
and the worth of reappropriating Dewey’s concepts of the individual
and sociality. By reappropriating John Dewey's concepts of the
individual and sociality and using them as feminist pedagogical
anchors, we are able to take possession of the cognitive powers of
interdependence. From the consideration of feminist models of
sociality, we can submit that a feminist model of friendship can serve
as the means for attaining broader and more heightened intellectual
abilities. The writings of John Dewey serve as primary sources while
texts on feminist theory provide the parameters for analysis.
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Mujeres, a no dejar que el peligro del viaje y la inmensidad del
territorio nos asuste - a mirar hacia adelante y a abrir paso en el monte
[Women, lets not the danger of the journey and the vastness of the
territory scare us - lets look forward and open paths in these woods).
(Moraga & Anzaldua, p. v, 1983)

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: A TIMELY CONSIDERATION

Good thinking, noted John Dewey, begins with consideration.

It

is through consideration, and the process of inquiry that follows, that
we gain meaning.

(Dewey, 1985, p. 8) When we engage in

consideration, when inquiry involves us in a dialectical relationship
between ourselves and the subject of our interest, we find new
connections and possibilities. A consideration, an inquiry, viewed in
this way, is "not a battle, it is communication" (Heldke, 1989, p. 113).
The following pages ask you to consider John Dewey's
educational philosophy from a different perspective, or more
precisely, to consider Deweyan thought through a composite feminist
lens.

Since feminist thinking encompasses many perspectives, the

view through each lens individually varies to degrees.
For this inquiry to consider each feminist perspective
individually and separately is unnecessary. This particular inquiry
begins by acknowledging the existence of "species under (feminism's]
genus" (Tong, 1989, p.l) and moves forward by suggesting that all
feminisms together can engage in a useful consideration of John
Dewey's philosophy. To suggest that there is only one feminist
perspective, one all-inclusive way in which all feminists everywhere
view the world, would be problematic for an inquiry which relies on
dialectic and theoretical flexibility. So to facilitate this inquiry, a
composite feminist lens, one which combines the typical and essential
characteristics of feminisms, is used as a metaphorical tool. Much like
Lugones and Spelman's demand for a "medley of women's voices" to be
1
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heard in feminist theory (1983, p. 21), this lens provides us with a
pliable view, a way in which feminisms can engage in the inquiry.
Engaging in this process of consideration requires that we begin
with the understanding that all forms of feminism are indeed
participating. Feminism in its many forms can enter this particular
investigation because we seek to discover the useful, and not to
become overly involved in a critical analysis of philosophical
antagonisms. There will be times, for example, when the essentialist
feminist position will be at odds with the focus of a particular
consideration. Nonetheless, such a position is still involved in, and
relevant to, this inquiry.
Though the "overarching feminist impulse" in academic
scholarship is to reveal masculine bias (Dubois, et al., 1987, p. 16), this
consideration will not have this as its particular focus, nor will we be
too concerned with proving that Dewey was or was not a feminist.
This particular inquiry asks that we engage in a critical consideration
of an established tradition and take from it that which is most useful,
practical and constructive for our feminist aims. Dewey's writing is
itself a "vast territory." What we hope to find are some ideas, concepts
and visions which can enrich our own feminist theories and practices.
To engage in consideration is a good thing for anyone but, I
assert, it is especially fitting for feminists. It is a feminist concern
that traditionally women have not been able to consider or been given
the opportunity to ponder the possibilities, to choose what is of value
to us. Consideration implies choice; it is an opportunity to view,
observe, question, interpret, ponder, judge and decide.

For feminists,

I believe that consideration is a political act. It is a demand for choice.
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for the power of decision-making.

It is a position of strength,

independence, confidence, maturity; the empowerment derived from
a purposeful act. There is nothing inherently weak, intellectually or
otherwise, in consideration. It is not an absence of integrity, nor of
decided posture. It is a bold and confident voice saying, "Wait! Let me
decide if this or that is good for me. Let me choose my path."
As with all acts, a feminist consideration has consequences but
this is a reality which is not feared. A feminist engaged in
consideration is not faint-hearted. Caution, not an unwillingness to
take a risk, characterize the act. When we consider patriarchal
philosophies and traditions it is because we are opportunistic.
Discerning something useful, we appropriate without fear of
compromise. We acknowledge the problematic where it exists but
reappropriate what will open paths and secure our aims.
A feminist consideration will engage its participants in "an
endless dialectical interplay between the observer who is being
observed; and the other, who, in being observed, is also observing his
observer" (Barrett, 1979, p. 184). In a sense, the observers, in this
case, we as feminist educational theorists, will find ourselves involved
in a conversation with Dewey. Each conversant will undoubtedly be
changed by this dialogue. Through our consideration, we will present
our understanding of Dewey and in the process, at times suggest
another interpretation. But of greater importance, is the fact that we
may find relevant wisdom for our theories and practices in Deweyan
thought.
This consideration of John Dewey's thought has several
objectives in mind. First and foremost, we should not lose sight of the
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fact that we aim to take what is valuable from Dewey’s philosophy and
not dwell too extensively on what is problematic.

Criticism of the

problematic is certainly valuable but in this inquiry, I suggest that it
may be a limiting exercise. What we discover to be of value to our
feminist agendas will serve to enrich and strengthen the movement,
thus to weigh down our investigation too heavily with criticism,
thwarts and frustrates the process of consideration and the possibility
of reappropriation. Instead, the feminist dialectic we use enables us to
creatively observe Dewey as well as ourselves.
This is not to say, however, that we will brush aside or pretend
not to see the problematic. On the contrary, we must acknowledge,
for example, the fact that John Dewey wrote little directly addressing
the education of girls and women and, as a rule, Dewey's
commentaries neglected women's experiences.

This is clearly an

issue given the fact that feminist analyses of social issues are womencentered. Though Dewey wrote about birth control, suffrage and co¬
education, it can't be said that the central theses in these works
concerned themselves specifically with the quality of girls' and
women's experiences. The absence of direct attention paid to gender
in Dewey's works is suspect, to be sure.
Dewey's attempts to address gender and girls' and women's
experience were either critical responses to the political climate
("Symposium on Women's Suffrage"), or to social conditions
("Education and Birth Control"), or to educational policy ("Is Co¬
education Injurious to Girls"). In each of these articles, Dewey, like
many philosophers before and after him, examined a particular issue
but kept gender as a secondary, if not absent concern. Women and
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girls, or more specifically, their experiences as women and as girls,
are discussed as objects to the subjects of politics, social policy and
education. Gender issues like birth control and voting rights are
discussed in the context of their impact on the greater human
condition and not as "gender" issues. Though he does recognize that
women's experiences differ from men's (Dewey, 1929, p. 846), John
Dewey's writings were never explicitly dedicated to an intellectual
examination of the female experiential world.
Dewey's failure to place women at the center of his philosophical
focus throughout his long life and many writings should be admitted
but should not, I insist, foil attempts at consideration. If we were to
suggest that only women-centered philosophies were those worthy of
intellectual examination and consideration, it would appear that we
would find little to consider. But more importantly, such a position,
dismisses the possibility that we can gain insight from thinking which
is outside of our own particular philosophical frameworks. For a
feminist to consider John Dewey's educational philosophy is, to
paraphrase Audre Lorde, not an attempt to re-build the master’s
house. Instead, it is a strategy to reappropriate his tools and build a
house of our own (Lorde, 1984).
But because this is a feminist consideration, we must take into
account those concerns directly relevant to feminist agendas.
Concerns about the nature of humans, about the nature of knowledge
and reason, and about the objectives of social life and the life of the
individual are at the core of feminist agendas and must therefore be
part of our investigation. However, given the scope and depth of each
of these concerns, and John Dewey's seemingly endless list of

6

publications, it will certainly be impossible to engage in an exhaustive
examination of each of these themes in this particular essay. Instead,
our consideration focuses on the concepts of the individual and social
life.
I choose to focus our consideration on the notions of the
individual and sociality because both John Dewey and feminist theory
securely anchor their experience-centered educational philosophies to
the educative potency of our interactions with the organic world. We
conduct our lives as individuals within a social environment. As
individuals, we act in a social context. For both Dewey and feminist
educators, interactions between individuals and their environments
lead to the kinds of experiences which form knowledge.
Chapter 2 begins this consideration in earnest by examining
how Dewey constructs the individual and sociality. Can we apply
Dewey's revisionist philosophy to our personal, political and social
worlds? Do Dewey's concepts of the individual and the social have the
characteristic connectedness that many feminists require? Do his
conceptualizations of the individual and the social have anything of
value for feminist agendas? Are feminist goals for the individual and
sociality possible through a Deweyan conceptualization? bell hooks
writes that "to change and transform [our concepts of) self and society
will determine the fate of the feminist revolution" (1991, p. 108).

Can

Dewey's individual and sociality help fuel the feminist revolution?
As we observe Dewey throughout this inquiry, as we consider his
ideas on the individual and society, we should seek not to reach a
compromise position where Dewey and feminisms can coexist, nor
should we simply react against his thinking. Both these postures.
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compromise and reaction, suggest that one position can control the
other. This is not the aim of consideration. Through consideration,
we examine, give attention to, notice and reflect on what we observe.
Such a process, such an endeavor, keeps feminist thinking dynamic,
fresh, evolving, and rich with possibilities for growth.
I begin this consideration by saying that there is no reason to
fear such a journey, because such a critical inquiry can only serve to
better our theories and practices.

It is important to acknowledge in

other philosophical traditions what is valuable, but it is all the more
important and good to consider and take possession of, to
reappropriate, all that enhances, strengthens, and deepens our own
particular theory. As John Dewey, himself, warned:
For in spite of itself, any movement that thinks and acts in terms
of an 'ism becomes so involved in reaction against other 'isms
that it is unwittingly controlled by them. (1938, p. 6)
This is the foundation of this paper's thesis as well as its perspective.
This inquiry will undoubtedly have implications for our
educational theories and practices, but perhaps of more consequence
are the implications that it will have for feminist theory. If John
Dewey’s philosophy proves useful to feminist educational ideals, that
is, if it proves serviceable for the feminist political act of teaching,
what then does feminism secure? Is feminism at a point in its
evolution where it can assume and implement aspects of an
educational theory seemingly outside of its own tradition?
Though the point can be made that any time is a good time to
consider philosophical postures, this particular consideration is timely
for several reasons.
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First is feminism's renewed interest in the American pragmatic
philosophical tradition. As Charlene Haddock Seigfried points out in
her article "Where Are All the Pragmatist Feminists?" American
pragmatism has "resources for feminist theory untapped by other
approaches" and adds that, in turn, feminism can "uniquely
reinvigorate pragmatism" (Seigfried, 1991, p. 2).

Seigfried argues that

the compatibility of these two traditions, rooted in a liberal base,
warrants attention from feminists. Feminism and American
pragmatism, according to Seigfried, hold similar positions regarding
the relationship between experience and meaning, the aligning of
theory and praxis. Both positions are critical of positivistic scientific
methodology and each emphasizes the aesthetic informing experience
and the validity of social, cultural and political analyses (Seigfried,
1991, p. 5).
Pragmatism, asserts Seigfried, is suitable for feminist
restructuring because of its desire to "dismantle the social and
political structures of oppression and to develop better alternatives"
(Seigfried, 1991, p. 2).

According to Seigfried, the "better

alternatives" proposed by pragmatism are
criticisms of positivist interpretations of scientific methodology;
disclosure of the value dimension of factual claims; reclaiming
aesthetics as informing everyday experience; linking of
dominant discourses with domination; subordinating logical
analysis to social, cultural and political issues; realigning theory
and praxis; and resisting the turn to epistemology and instead
emphasizing concrete experience (1991, p. 5)
These "alternatives" suggest to me that pragmatists had a vision
of the individual that could not be solitary nor detached but engaged in
active and intentional correspondence with the social world.

It would
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seem that the pragmatist's individual, informed by everyday
experience, had to be engaged in a reciprocal relationship with others.
This idea is expressed by Dewey in Human Nature and Conduct when
he writes that "for human beings, the environing affairs directly
important are those formed by the activities of other human beings"
(1922, p. 84). That the individual is constantly informed by others
suggests to me that the pragmatic conception of the social and of the
individual could not be dualistic and dichotomous. For how can the
correspondence of individuals, how can this reciprocal relationship
not be fueled (at some level) by shared interests?
Seigfried's suggestion that feminists reclaim American
pragmatism is important to this particular inquiry because it
introduces perhaps the most salient point of this work: that by
neglecting to consider a past philosophical position, we stand to lose
the opportunity to reappropriate what is useful

I agree with Seigfried

when she asserts that there is a feminine side to pragmatism, a side
for which it was "relegated to the margins" (Seigfried, 1991, p. 5).
Pragmatism's criticism of positivistic interpretation of scientific
methodology, its belief in aesthetics informing everyday experience
and emphasis on concrete experience and not on epistemology are
positions which Seigfried asserts are both feminist and pragmatic
(1991, p. 5).

In effect, its philosophical marginalization may have been

the result of these positions, positions which feminism champions
today.
So why specifically John Dewey? Together with Charles Sanders
Pierce, William James, Josiah Royce and George Herbert Mead, John
Dewey fashioned the American pragmatism that I suggest is so
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compatible with feminist thinking. Why not consider one of these
other American pragmatists?
Feminists address social issues which affect women in particular
and humanity in general. Dewey's pragmatic philosophy was social
criticism and, like other pragmatists, called for the inclusion of
multiple and varied perspectives (Seigfried, 1991, p. 14).

Present day

feminists such as Maria Lugones, bell hooks and Trinh T. Minh-ha
echo these very concerns. But John Dewey is the focus of this
particular consideration because it is Dewey who recognized that
philosophy and education were one and the same. John Dewey
reasoned that in order to solve social problems, philosophers and
theorists must actively engage themselves in educational discourse. In
his autobiographical essay titled "From Absolutism to
Experimentalism" Dewey addresses this very point:
Although a book called Democracy and Education was for many
years that in which my philosophy, such as it is, was most fully
expounded, I do not know that philosophic critics, as distinct
from teachers, have ever had recourse to it. I have wondered
whether such facts signified that philosophers in general,
although they are themselves usually teachers, have not taken
education with sufficient seriousness for it to occur to them that
any rational person could actually think it possible that
philosophizing should focus about education as the supreme
human interest in which, moreover, other problems,
cosmological, moral, logical, come to a head. (Dewey, 1960,
p. 14)
Dewey valued education because it was that concrete experience
where all theories were tested.

His pragmatism positions education as

the center of a philosophical circle. This fact alone invites feminist
educational theorists to engage in a critical consideration of his work.

The reasons for a feminist consideration of John Dewey extend beyond
this, however.
At the heart of feminist theory, no matter what brand we
consider, there is a rejection of dualisms and universals, and a belief in
the union of theory and practice. John Dewey provided us with an
educational theory in which practice and theory are integrated and a
posteriori reasoning is valued. Nancy Hartsock discussed these issues
ten years ago in Building Feminist Theory, but they are still relevant
today.
Hartsock's feminist method stresses the examination of
experience, an examination which is through our senses as well as
through our intellect.

It is a methodology where connections are

drawn between personal experience and generality, and in which our
understanding of the social world is derived from human association
(Hartsock, 1981, p. 32).

In their critique of feminist research, Liz

Stanley and Sue Wise discuss the need for connection between theory
and practice, a relationship which demands the absence of traditional
dualisms and dichotomies (Stanley & Wise, 1983). The emphasis on
objectivity, an integral player in the traditional Western paradigms of
knowledge, suggests that knowers and the objects of their knowledge
are separated and that knowledge is free of social influence.
Feminist theorist Lorraine Code argues this very point in her
analysis of subjectivity, further stressing the need for feminism to
dismiss such dichotomies as subjective/objective. As Code writes, in a
feminist framework, "dichotomies are especially problematic in that
they posit exclusionary constructs, not complementary or
interdependent ones" (1991, p. 29), imposing boundaries "unduly
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restrictive" (p. 28). And, if, as Code suggests, feminist theory seeks to
acquire an understanding of the experiential world, and I would agree
that it does, we must consider not so much the origins of dichotomy
but rather, the interaction between these so called opposites and the
continuum in between. Experience can not and does not exist solely
within two polarities, or at least such has been the case in my short
life.

I can think of few experiences which seem to be categorically

either/or. Further, I suggest that we may find that identifying reality
as non-linear, allows us to validate reciprocity between the knower
and the known, confirming the richness of experience and its primary
role in feminist learning.
Dewey made it quite clear throughout his lifetime that adhering
to dualistic philosophies created barriers which prevented the "fluent
and free intercourse" between women and men (Dewey, 1916, p. 333).
In effect, noted Dewey, a tradition of dualistic thinking set up the
"different types of life-experience, each with isolated subject matter,
aim and standard of values [which marked off) social groups and
classes within a group; like those between rich and poor, men and
women, noble and basebom, ruler and ruled"(1916, p. 333). Dualistic
thinking was for Dewey, a limiting philosophy. The either/or
characteristic of dualistic thinking separated the knower from the
known, disregarding the impact of real experience on meaning.
Knowledge, Dewey claimed, is a perception of the connections
between the knower and the known, and "an ideally perfect
knowledge" would reflect the "network of interconnections that any
past experience would offer a point of advantage from which to get at
the problem presented in a new experience" (1916, p. 340).

The
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multiple meanings of reality were for Dewey a result of the
connections made between the knower and the known and not a
product of indifferent dualistic reasoning.
Dewey viewed the early 20th century advances in physiology and
psychology as evidence that the ancient dualism of mind and body held
no reasonable ground. As a naturalist, Dewey viewed mind and body as
organic entities which are never separated from experiential reality.
Mind, in Dewey's view, emerged from action and not from spiritual
providence.

As the body is involved in interdependent experiences,

mind emerges as that capacity to foresee a future possibility, and as
the ability to engage in "precisely intentional purposeful activity
controlled by perception of facts and relationships to one another"
(Dewey, 1916, p. 103). The sciences of physiology and psychology
certified for Dewey the organic verity of the mind. The brain, as an
organ of knowing, is not isolated from the other bodily organs,
especially those of response. The brain is the body's "machinery" for
the reciprocal adjustment between stimuli and responses. It is not an
isolated, nor purely receptive and passive entity. The mind, wrote
Dewey, is not a "passive spectator of the universe" (1967, p. 15). Thus
knowing could not be separate from the everyday human realities but
rather a process of the "perception of those connections of an object
which determines its applicability in a given situation" (Dewey, 1916,
p. 340).

In knowing, we reorganize realities in order to meet new

conditions. Through interaction with universal matter, Dewey's
"mind" and "body" work together to construct meaning and theory and
direct future actions. The knower and the known in a Dewey an
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framework are always bound to each other in a relational interplay of
construction and reconstruction.
The separation of mind and body was problematic for Dewey also
because, in effect, it served to disassociate thought from our everyday
occupations, and most importantly, grounded the "erroneous
conception" that knowledge and social interests, and that individuality
and freedom, were unrelated. If mind and body are separate, reasoned
Dewey, then the individual mind must be unassociated with the
organic world. It would follow that individual minds must be
separated from each other (Dewey, 1916, p. 292). The purposes of a
human sociality based on such dualistic thinking would certainly
render individuals intellectually and socially irresponsible, a
phenomenon Dewey saw as socially inefficient and immoral.
Knowledge, for Dewey, requires knowing people.
Much of the feminist educational discourse involves these same
Deweyan ideas. Frances Maher, for example, sketches an "interactive
pedagogy" which is Deweyan at its roots. In her 1985 article,
"Pedagogies for the Gender-Balanced Classroom," Maher bases her
pedagogical alternative on the belief that knowers and objects of their
knowledge are indeed connected and socially influenced.
Acknowledging that experiences are relevant to learning, Maher's
"interactive pedagogy" integrates students' experiences into the
subject matter. It recognizes that reality is "shaped by our gender and
our sexuality, an identification which separates all class, race and
cultural experiences into various male and female versions" (Maher,
1985, p. 50). It is pedagogy which is inductive in nature, whose
ultimate goal is "the creation of shared meaning through collective
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problem-solving" (p. 51), rather than through the use of universal
thruths and a priori reasoning.
Dewey's Democracy and Education is a testament to his belief
that knowledge is produced in multiple contexts.

By "conceiving the

connections between ourselves and the world in which we live"
(Dewey, 1916, p. 344), he writes, we are able to learn and thus able to
know. The fact that he constructs his school to be most like society is
an indication that he values the opportunities for learning available
outside of the transmission of information characteristic of our
educational tradition. "Learning in school should be continuous with
that out of school" and "free interplay between the two" must take
place (Dewey, 1916, p. 358). Thus for Dewey, an "ideally perfect
knowledge" would embody a "network of interconnections" (Dewey,
1916, p. 340).
Because Dewey assigns the nature of experience a personal/
individual quality, we can presume that feminism would find his views
on knowledge and the acquisition of knowledge acceptable.

Belenky,

Clinchy, Goldberger and Tarule suggest that knowledge implies
"personal acquaintance with an object" and an "intimacy" between the
self and the object (Belenky, 1986, p. 101). Dewey utters much the
same when he declares that "every act of mind involves relation" and
that "all knowledge occurs in the medium of feeling" (Dewey, 1967,
pp. 205, 215). He furthers this idea when he writes
There is no consciousness which exists as wholly objectified,
that is, without connection with some individual. There is, in
other words, no consciousness which is not feeling. (Dewey,
1967, p. 215)
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Death, for example, is something which exists in the universe. We
experience the death of a loved one and come to know "loss" through
the medium of feeling. In many ways, the "inaccessible knowledge and
passion within" women that Mary Daly identifies, becomes more
"readily accessible" (Daly, 1984, pp. 235-237) in Dewey's ideology.
Feminist educational philosophies, then, bare striking
resemblance to John Dewey's educational treatise. But to say that
John Dewey's and feminist educational philosophies are compatible or
congruous is not adequate given the definition of and possibilities in
consideration. More importantly, it is inadequate for the purposes of
this essay. A goal of consideration is the possibility of reappropriating
the useful and as such, it will be necessary to present what feminist
educational theorists can reappropriate from Dewey. The last and
concluding chapter will present what our consideration has
determined may be useful, and in the process, inject a cautionary word
about the hazards of dismissing the knowledge of the past, the hazards
of our outlooks.
In this concluding chapter titled "The Hazards of Outlook, " I
consider the implications of philosophical outlook as it pertains to the
feminist educator. For the feminist educator, gaining insight from an
established tradition and taking what is most useful is both practical
and constructive. Establishing such a perspective is, as the founder of
the New York Feminist Theatre Lucy Winer suggests, "very difficult
and complicated" (1981, p. 304).

She warns that the feminist project

must maintain distance, yet still be able to focus on what is useful in
the cultural heritage being observed. But as feminist educational
theorists, we must recognize that we have, as feminists, a special
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vantage point that marginality affords. Similar to black women’s
"special vantage point," we must, as bell hooks demands of black
women, criticize, envision and create (1984, p. 15).
Making this consideration timely for yet another reason is the
discussion among contemporary feminists about the "second wave" of
white American feminism and its need to include the Third World
women's perspectives in its theoretical framework.

Feminists such as

bell hooks, Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Gloria Anzaldua, Cherrie Moraga
and Maria Lugones write about the exclusion of Third World women in
feminist mainstream thought, explaining that Third World women and
their experiences are unrecognizable in these theories.

Lugones

writes:
I think that the fact that we are so ill at ease with your
theorizing [about Third World women] does indicate that there
is something wrong with these theories. But what is it that is
wrong? Is it simply that these theories are flawed if meant to be
universal but accurate so long as they are confined to your
particular group(s)? Is it that the theories need to be
translated? Is it something about the process of theorizing that
is flawed?...Where do we begin? (Lugones & Spelman, 1983,
p. 578)
This contemporary issue in feminist theory relates directly to
our inquiry. Feminism, like any other theory, must engage in many
dialogues out of necessity. If feminist theory is to evolve, deepen and
extend its understanding of our worlds, then its theorists must stop
and consider the "vastness of the territor[ies]" placed before them.
Issues of gender, multi-cultural and racial differences are pressing
issues for present-day feminist theorists. As feminist theorists, we
must engage in critical inquiries of our pasts and presents, all the
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while, "nourish[ing] the critical spirit of inquiry [that] is always
creative" (Freire, 1972, p. 17).
This critical consideration of John Dewey's philosophy examines
his views on the individual and sociality. Each of these is certainly
relevant in any discussion of any form of feminism but their selection
as points to examine and give thought to is intentional in another way.
I suspect that how we construct knowledge and our view of ourselves
and our socialities are inextricably bound together. Each in a myriad
of ways, dictates the shape, form and expression of the others and
consequently, has implications for a feminist project. Like Dewey, I
am interested in change and growth through continuous self-renewal,
and more to the point, believe that an educative experience gives us
"an added power of subsequent direction and control" (Dewey, 1916,
p. 77). This investigation is a process and not an end in itself. We
engage in this consideration hoping that the process will educate us,
and as feminists, serve to "add power" to our many directions, and
"acarrear con orgullo las tareas de deshelar corazones y cambiar
conciencias (to carry with pride the task of thawing hearts and
changing consciousness)" (Moraga & Anzaldua, 1983, p. 5).

CHAPTER 2
ABOUT SOCIALITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL

All feminisms struggle in some way or another to find the
connections between self/individual and the group/sociality. It is
indeed a struggle given the prevalence of Western dualistic ideas of
the individual and society which place each at odds with the other.
Feminisms, on the other hand, where "the personal is political," view
self and identity as undeniably related to sociality and solidarity but
find that in our personal, political and social worlds, this unity of
concepts is largely absent.
John Dewey's educational philosophy embodied an uneasiness
with the tensions between the individual and sociality inherent in
dualistic thinking. What can we learn from considering Dewey's
revisionist concepts of the individual and sociality? Can we discover
the connectedness which seems so vital to feminist ends, and
particularly to feminist educational ambitions? bell hooks writes that
"to change and transform (our concepts ofl self and society will
determine the fate of the feminist revolution" (1991, p. 108). Will
Dewey's construction of the individual and sociality help fuel "the
feminist revolution"?
In Meditations on Modem Political Thought Jean Bethke
Elshtain remarks that feminism reflects the tensions between
individualism and the common good and between individual rights and
sociality" (1986, p. 56). It is a reflection, notes Elshtain, which is
characterized by individuals with shared purposes and collective
identities.

Recent feminist scholarship fleshes out the tension
19
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Elshtain describes, suggesting that perhaps the tension between the
individual and the group, in actuality, is thicker and more complex
(Fox-Genovese, 1991). It is a tension which is the result of a tradition
whose definition of the individual and of society sets the two in
opposition. The use of the term "tension" alone connotes a
contrariety, an antithesis between the two conceptions.
Let's begin here, then, with the idea that feminism reflects the
tension between two concepts supposedly in opposition and suggest
that a feminist conception of the individual and the social is
characteristically harmonious and cohesive. This is the starting point
of this chapter's consideration.
In this chapter, we will look at Dewey's conceptualization of the
individual and of sociality, a term which I will use to refer to his
notions of social life—life within groups, society at large and
community, the fact and condition of being associated with others. We
will look at how Dewey envisioned the coalescence of the individual
and sociality, how his concept of democracy is that social state which
unifies the individual and society. What we will find is that Dewey
resolves the purported tension producing conflict between the
individual and the social not by redefining these terms in the strictest
sense but by untangling its tradition, dissecting its evolution and
reassembling its definition. In many ways, Dewey's fusion of the
individual and the social was a reconsideration necessary for the
attainment of what he viewed as a moral and ethical social order.
Our consideration must include a discussion of Dewey's notion of
democracy given that it is through this particular conception of social
order that the individual and the social are integrated. After having
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considered Dewey's model for sociality, democracy, we will engage in
a consideration of feminist models. How each model can or can not
bring about the integration of the social with the individual, and how
each addresses or concerns itself with real world issues, for example,
socio-economic class, is a part of our inquiry. Finally, we will consider
what, if anything, we can reappropriate as a result of this critical
consideration of Deweyan individuality and sociality.
Let's now consider John Dewey's conceptualizations of the
individual and of community. Let's consider whether his fusion of the
individual and the social can resolve the tensions reflected in
feminism, the existence of which makes this consideration once again
timely.

2.1 Deweys "Community"Group,” and "Society"
In Democracy and Education Dewey writes that society and
community are equivocal terms. Society, he says, is "conceived as one
by its very nature" and the qualities which make up this oneness are
those which are emphasized by solidarity. The qualities he attributes
to this unity are "praiseworthy community of purpose and welfare,
loyalty to public ends, mutuality of sympathy" (p. 82). Society then,
should have a shared alliance of interests, objectives and standards,
and a concern for the common good. The implication is that in
Dewey's society individual interests aren't antithetical to those of the
group and taken a step further, that individual rights within the social
unit are not suppressed nor are their 'rights' denied. In a very early
paper, Dewey assembles a definition of democracy which injects an
'organic' interpretation of the individual and society. He views society
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as a whole and perfect organism existing for and by individuals. As an
integral part of the whole, individuals are not socially isolated units but
rather constitute the spirit and will of all (Dewey, 1888). Though in
his early writings Dewey's individual was defined within a Hegelian
ideal and though Dewey's later writings don't have such a quality, he
continued to believe that the ultimate interests of individuals and
society were indeed reconcilable.
As several scholars, such as Frederick Schultz have concluded,
the differences between Dewey's "society" and "community" are
unclear. In The Public and Its Problems, a text in which Dewey
directly addresses communal living, Dewey implies that a society can
be transformed into a community, giving the impression that
communal living is of a higher social order or, at the very least, a more
advanced form of associated living.
In The Public and Its Problems, Dewey writes that the "Great
Society" can be transformed through intelligent action into the "Great
Community." What he viewed as the "Great Society" was the 1920's
pre-Depression America which was rapidly advancing in technology
and industry. Dewey, however, saw such advancement as both positive
and problematic.

In effect, he reasoned, the rise of technology

controlled by private profit and a "money culture," prevented the Great
Society from acknowledging shared concerns and achieving shared
ends. Acknowledging shared concerns and achieving mutual goals was
a characteristic of local groups and communities which Dewey viewed
as central and primary for the Great Community to evolve. What he
envisioned was greater social cohesiveness, larger and an infinitely
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more inclusive union of human beings, across and between groups,
across and between societies.
In order to transform "society" into "community," Dewey
reasoned that members would have to be aware of and acknowledge
mutual concerns and develop the method of intelligence to bring about
mutually agreed upon ends. In effect, we have to be willing to see that
our own individual concerns are similar to, if not the same as, those of
others. To do this requires a method of intelligence reflecting the
relationship between community and communication, and
communication and intelligence.

In the modem, technological life,

Dewey purported, a life focused on material gain is incapable of seeing
and acknowledging the relevance of others’ concerns to our own.

He

reasoned that our ability to become aware of our connections is
ultimately what enables us to form communities:
The planets in constellation would form a community if they
were aware of the connections of the activities of each with
those of others. (1927, p. 25)
Thus, given that as humans we have the capacity for awareness—the
capacity for intelligence—we should be able to engage in communal
life. The suggestion is that individual intelligence will enable us to
understand that sharing mutual concerns and aims is advantageous for
all, and that this in itself resolves the "conflict" between the individual
and society. Though Dewey never explicitly says that in achieving
"community" the individual and society are reconciled and made
cohesive, my reading suggests that such is the case with Dewey.
It is important to state and make note of the fact that Dewey's
"community" is not a static sociality. Dewey's community is always
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incomplete, always emerging.

Each generation, in Dewey s view,

should re-interpret the human condition, the passions, canons, and
customs of the previous generations (Dewey, 1927, p. 154). This
makes sense given that Dewey's community is achieved through
interaction, through participation in associated life. With each new
generation, with each new advance in human intelligence, it becomes
necessary to assess, to consider the value of a previous standard in
order to progress personally and socially.
"Society" for Dewey is really "societies," the many and different
forms of human association. Society is not a useful term for Dewey.
Instead, he suggests in Individualism: Old and New that it is better to
think in terms of "law, industry, religion, medicine, politics, art,
education, philosophy" and to think of these in the plural. He asks us
to think of society not in "huge and large ways," but rather as
"avenues": law, industry, religion, etc. It is via these avenues that we
act upon the world and the world acts upon us (1929, p. 166). These
"avenues" are the conditions in which the multiple and varied forms of
interactions between individuals take place, according to Dewey.
Thus, it would follow, that because human interactions vary from
person to person, across time, and because these are not static
interactions capable of being repeated precisely the same way twice,
"society" can not be static either.

2.2 Dewey’s Individual and Society
The requirement that individual personality develop with the
influence of societal interactions suggests that Dewey firmly integrated
individual and society. Thinking of the individual and society as

25

opposing abstractions was for Dewey a sure way of preventing true
social thinking. In reality, he reasoned, the individual and the social
are just categories through which we can gain an understanding of our
worlds. To think of either the "individual" or "Society" as a singular,
particular entity defined by some abstract, general idea, dismisses the
facts of association and interaction. The individual is not the "spatially
isolated thing our imagination inclines to take it to be," remarks
Dewey (1927, p. 187). Instead, Dewey's individual is a collection of
particular potentialities which are elicited and validated through
association. In a way, Dewey views the term "individual" as a general
term which can not fully describe all of its particular manifestations.
The beliefs, purposes, passions and actions of individuals are due to
the influences of their associations and interactions, interactions
which are not one-way transactions between the "individual" and an
ambiguous "Society." Relations are between individuals and not
between individuals and Society. And it is in this relation, this "social
medium," that individuals live. It is through and because of associated
life or "social medium" that individuals are "influenced by
contemporary and transmitted culture, whether in conformity or
protest. The culture of a period is a determining influence in the
"arrangement of the native constituents of human nature. What is
generic and the same everywhere is at best the organic structure of
man, his biological make-up" (Dewey, 1927, p. 195).
Dewey's individual is not a function of a "ready-made" human
nature. As a living organism, Dewey's individual is a "temporal
development" whose uniqueness in history is not "something given
once for all at the beginning which then proceeds to unroll as a ball of
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yam may be unwound" (1960, p. 230). The potentialities of individuals
develop through interactions with cultural conditions, an assertion he
defends by stating that if human nature were a relative constant", it
could not account for the multitude of diversities" (1939, p. 19). As an
unshaped potentiality, a possibility or capacity for becoming actual,
Dewey's individuality is incomplete and takes shape only through
interactions with real situations. Dewey's individual is not
a mere property of nature, set in place according to a scheme
independent of him, as an article is put in its place in a cabinet,
but he adds something, that he makes a contribution. (Dewey,
1925, p. 172)
For Dewey, the idea that human nature is inherently
individualistic, ie., egocentric and narcissistic, is a product of a
cultural condition he called the "cultural individualistic movement"
characteristic of the traditions of 18th century liberalism and
American democracy (Dewey, 1939).

The "liberalism" Dewey

disdained so vehemently is the outgrowth of several social forces, two
of which, Locke's "natural rights" philosophy and the doctrine of
laissez-faire, he found particularly inimical. The "natural rights"
philosophy of the late 1600's which created the belief that individual
needs were primary, and the laissez-faire doctrine which gave rise to
an individual economic blindness were, for Dewey, primarily
responsible for the polarization of individual and the social. Even the
Church, with its emphasis on the salvation of the individual soul
seemed to add to the invention of polarity (Dewey, 1930).
The individualism Dewey insisted on is not the "old
individualism" which held the interests and rights of the individual as
primary. This "old individualism," had its roots in the individualistic
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sentiments which rose to prominence in 18th and 19th century
England and France. This particular brand of individualism, he felt,
gave power and freedom to few. In Chapter V of Individualism: Old
and New he provides us with a sketch of the "new Individualism"
which stresses the interconnections of the "vast complex of
associations" in the modern technological world. These connections,
he insisted, introduce harmony and cohesiveness to the state of
society (Dewey, 1930, pp. 74-100).
This "old" individualism, Dewey writes, is the consequence of
medieval and feudal institutions, institutions which were the means of
accomplishing the eternal happiness of the soul, and the secular
industrial revolution which fostered the belief that the essential
characteristic of all individuals was a motivation for personal gain.
Under the influence of Protestantism, individual capitalism, a natural
rights philosophy and morals based on "strictly individual traits and
values" flourished. The American version of this individualism took
things a step further and "equated personal gain with social [economic
and class] advance" (Dewey, 1929, pp. 75-77).
The problem with this individualism, purported Dewey, is that
in the modem, industrial and technological world, because institutions
are run for private, personal profit, institutional aims are not social
aims. Industry and technology are private endeavors, avenues to
personal, private, individual profit. Individual aims in this view, are
"narrow" aims, purely driven by the motivation for individual monetary
wealth and social class status. The interest in private profit created
our "money culture," a culture which Dewey believed could not allow
us to see, and thus address, our purposeful sociality.
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Dewey's "new" individualism, in contrast, merged the personal
with the social (Dewey, 1930). Dewey's individual should, in a sense,
have an integrated individuality whose aims are not purely personal,
nor purely social. Such an individuality, he insisted, is not a ready¬
made essentially human characteristic. It is a capacity for
development which is always incomplete and evolving. Given this, it
becomes absolutely critical for the environment to provide those
conditions under which such potentialities can emerge and be
confirmed.

For Dewey, communication, intelligence and interaction

appear to be those conditions necessary for the development of an
integrated individual.
What we see in Dewey's concepts of individual, individualism,
and individuality, is similar to what we saw in his construction of
sociality. The terms appear to blend into each other, to be parts of a
larger, more comprehensive human process.

Each is something to be

achieved; none is a fixed mold. None are absolute, but rather, each is
relative. Nothing about each term seems automatic. It is as if
"individual," "individuality," and "individualism" are but parts of a
dynamic composite called human being.
Thus it was Dewey's contention that the supposed opposition
between the individual and society was the result of social forces
designed to legitimize those prevailing individual rights ideologies.

In

"Time and Individuality" he makes this point quite clearly when he
writes;
The weakness of the philosophy originally advanced to justify the
democratic movement was that it took individuality to be
something given ready-made; that is, in abstraction from time,
instead of as a power to develop. (1960, p. 242)
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The result of a cultural interaction then, should not be construed as an
inherent "nature" or predisposition.

Cultural conditions develop

individuality, along with genetic inheritance, as a result of unique
interactions, therefore, one can not say that human nature is innately
individualistic. On the contrary, Dewey's comments imply that the
social is part and parcel of the individual, that it is an essential,
integral and constituent element of the individual. Further, he holds
that "the spirit of personality indwells in every individual and that the
choice to develop it must proceed from that individual" (Dewey, 1888,
p. 22).
In Ethics, though Dewey does not deny the uniqueness of each
individual, he makes the case that there are many individuals and that
there is no one single society or form of association. The conflicts
which have traditionally been viewed as conflicts between classes or
groups are conflicts which exist between some individuals and some
groups, not between the constructs "individual" and "society."
Conflicts such as those between the dominant class and the rising
class, between private enterprise and public agencies, between the
conservative and the liberal or radical have led to the belief that the
struggles arise from the antagonism between the individual and
society.

It is the conflict of interests between these groups that really

creates social disputes, Dewey contends (Dewey, 1908, pp. 358-363).
But if there is a constant in humans, Dewey would contend that
it is the fact that humans are a part of nature and, as such, are social
beings. Plainly put, "individuals are social by nature" (Dewey, 1930,
p. 82), and as social beings, they are likely to encounter conditions
which will develop a myriad of potentialities, of which individuality
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and sociality are inevitable. Human associations can, therefore, not be
external but rather are defined by the intricacies of relationship and
interaction (Dewey, 1930, p. 82). We are not just de facto associated.
The very fact that interaction has consequences means that we affect
"society" in some way. Though we may think and act individually, the
consequences are the result of interaction. We are not just actually
associated; we are implicated by our associations.
We become social animals in the make-up of ideas, sentiments
and through purposeful behavior. What one believes, desires, and
strives toward is the result of interaction and engagement (Dewey,
1927, p. 13). He even proposes that the human dilemma is to protect
"the development of each constituent (individuality and sociality) so
that it serves to release and mature the other" (1939, p. 22), a
suggestion that leads one to suspect that in a Deweyan scheme, the
private and public spheres may be integrated. In The Human
Condition Hannah Arendt states:
No human life, not even the life of the hermit in nature's
wilderness, is possible without a world which directly or
indirectly testifies to the presence of other human beings. All
human activities are conditioned by the fact that men live
together... (1958, p. 22)
It is this same idea that Dewey suggests when he states that humans
are a part of nature and, as such, are social beings.
This mutual dependence between the individual and the social
which Dewey submits is characterized by a reciprocity of interests and
varied inter- and intra- group actions. The individuals in Dewey's
social unit share purposes, are mutually sympathetic and are loyal to
the group's aims. The "worth" of the group can thus be measured by
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t±ie degree to which interests are shared among group members and
the cooperation with other groups. The "standard" for measuring the
worth is one which assures that the ideal society is not the
benchmark. Rather, Dewey's criteria avoids this extreme, suggesting a
"practicable" appraisal. Worth is thus assessed by the degree to which
the interests consciously shared are "numerous and varied" and by
"how full and free" the interactions are with other groups (Dewey,
1916, p. 83).

If there is minimal common interest between members

and if that interest isolates the group, "barriers to free intercourse and
communication of experience" are assured. Such barriers, asserts
Dewey, make the group or social unit or society "undesirable." The
more fruitful the association and intercourse between human beings,
the greater their experience.

The greater their experience, the more

progressive an individual's growth. And progressive growth, according
to Dewey, is the distinguishing trait of intelligence, a society's most
important asset (Dewey, 1916, pp. 81-99).
What other attributes of individuality does Dewey suggest are
compatible with those of sociality? Does Dewey examine these
idiosyncrasies as they are actually expressed? In the Ethics of
Democracy Dewey's discourse on the difference between a true
democracy and aristocracy addresses these questions.
According to Dewey, aristocracy has failed to assert true
individuality because its members have "ceased to remain wise and
good." They have "become ignorant of the needs and requirements of
the many" and leave the many outside the pale with no real share in
the commonwealth" (1888, p. 20). He goes on to say that the
aristocracy "limits the range of men... in the unity of purpose and
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destiny; and it always neglects to see that those theoretically included
really obtain their well being" (1888, p. 21).

Even when the aristoi

engage in philanthropic organizations, Dewey claims that this is "good
which is procured from without" and is not a "realization... of the
unified spirit of community" (1888, p. 21-22). He is suggesting that
personal responsibility, individual initiation, and unity of purpose must
begin with the individual, that "personality is the first and final reality"
(1888, p. 23). This individualism that is ethical, responsible and
lawful is a trustworthy element in his conception of personality. It is
"the one thing of permanent and abiding worth" and from it "result the
other notes of democracy, liberty, equality and fraternity" (1888,
p. 23).
It seems that Dewey is assigning to all individuals a potentiality
which when fully and freely realized, is in accord with the ideals of
sociality. It would be erroneous to deduce from this implication that
humans are all of the same "nature". Dewey underscores the term
"potentiality" and means just that, the ability to develop into existence.
Further, this is only a most general potentiality and it's clear that he
values those potentialities which realize themselves through the
democratic process. Liberty and equality are all individual
potentialities which are developed within the democratic process but
individuals may choose to develop this potentiality or may choose
against it. The appropriate cultural conditions must be present for
this potential to be realized and, as could be expected, it is education's
role to set forth these conditions, conditions democracy can
engender.
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2.3 The Union of the Individual and Sociality
How does Dewey's democracy unify the individual and society?
How does democracy bring about the "perfect man in perfect state"
(Dewey, 1888, p. 19)?
Dewey's democracy is much more than a form of government.
As an ethical alliance, it brings about a moral individualism which
connects the individual with others in society. In many ways, Dewey
denied many of our religious traditions which grant the individual a
spiritual intimacy with God and, instead, purported that such spiritual
intimacy was between individuals (Dewey, 1930; 1916, p. 122). He
goes on to submit that the individual is the means for democracy and
exacts on the individual the responsibility for attaining democratic
ends. This is a classic Dewey equation: means and ends, process and
objective, growth and experience, individual and society all interactive
and constantly renewing. The individual must be able to adjust and
redefine, a course which Western religious traditions obstruct. For
Dewey, these traditions dictated "fixed and comprehensive goals" for
the individual, objectives which distanced humans from nature. The
religious concepts of mortality and immortality turned humans away
from the good of all and toward the good of self (Dewey, 1930).
Democracy, it would follow, must not separate individuals from nature
and must provide the opportunity for individual growth.
The democratic arrangement urged by John Dewey has as its
means and ends the integration of the individual and society. More
than a political order, Deweyan democracy is a means for realizing
truly social goals. It is "a way of life, social and individual." As a way of
life, it is expressed as
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the necessity for the participation of every mature human being
in formation of the values that regulate men living together:
which is necessary from the standpoint of both the general
social welfare and the full development of human beings as
individuals. (Dewey, 1937, p. 457)
It is a human way of life which requires in its practice "universal
suffrage, recurring elections, responsibility of those who are in
political power to the voters" (Dewey, 1937, p. 457).

First and

foremost, Deweyan democracy is a spirit, an attitude. It is a "spirit of
understanding, sympathy, and cooperation within social classes and
between social classes" (Horne, 1978, p. 112).
At its core this vision of democracy is founded on the belief in
the abilities of human beings, in their capacity for intelligence and in
the vitality of collective sociality. Belief in an individual's entitlement
to social equality, to freedom of social inquiry, to freedom of thought
and expression are all elemental in this democracy and are necessary
for the individual and society to live and work as one. As such, this
democratic design approximates the ideal of all social systems
because, as Dewey pronounces," the individual and society are organic
to each other" (1888, p. 14). Mutual interests must then direct this
truly democratic society and it follows that change must be the result
of human associations.
As a central point in Liberalism and Social Action Dewey
proposes a democracy that is essentially a commitment to a
"cooperative intelligence" as a "social asset." Through an organized
intelligence, individuals in a democracy can bring claims out into the
open and make wise decisions. A "freed intelligence as a social force"
is a necessary condition for Dewey's democracy, a condition which can
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be brought about by the "full development of the personality" through
an education which 'frees' the individual’s capacity for progressive
growth (1935, pp. 61-81). In this way, the individual can acquire a
mind of his own, a mind not isolated from the "knowledge of things
incarnate in the life about him." Thus the "intellectual variations of the
individual" become agencies of social progress (Dewey, 1916,
pp. 95-98).
As a method for "getting knowledge and making sure that it is
knowledge and not mere opinion" (Dewey, 1916, p. 339), the
experimental method provided Dewey yet another means for proving
that a dualistic theory of knowledge is only dogma and that a theory of
knowing derived from practice, from experience, could stimulate free
interchange and enrich social continuity. Dewey's conviction that full
and free interactions are necessary for social progress is undeniably
bound to his belief in the values of scientific/ experimental thinking.
Genuinely democratic Deweyan sociality demands that each individual
be free to engage in trial and error thinking, in hypothesis testing, and
observation. The scope of an individual's experiences will
consequently dictate the breadth and fullness of his thinking, which in
turn, directs his sociality. Sociality, experience and thinking are all
interwoven.

Experience, practice, and theory;

research, theory and

experience, are in a dynamic, multi-dimensional interrelation that is
by definition, value laden, concerned with the particular, and real.
On the surface, John Dewey's insistence on the use of the
scientific or experimental method to bring forward "cooperative
intelligence" seems problematic for the feminist scholar.

Is there

value for us in such a tradition? Scientific methodology's emphasis on
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"objectivity," and on deductive reasoning, present us with some
ideological difficulties.

For example, the importance placed on

difference rather than sameness, on the visual rather than the tactile,
and in the construction of generalizations rather than the concern for
the particulars, appears to remove traditional scientific methodology
from the purview of feminist inquiry (Hartsock, 1981; Stanley, 1983,
p. 32-43).

In Dewey's definition of scientific thinking, these issues are

also ideologically problematic.
For Dewey, deductive reasoning was not entirely worthless or
without merit. Deductive reasoning, according to Dewey, could be
used to "challenge attention" to a problem. But to engage in such
reasoning without "first making acquaintance with the particular
facts," leads one to close off possibilities, making inquiry inflexible and
miseducative. "Acquaintance with the particular facts that create a
need for definition and generalization" motivates a kind of inductive
inquiry that is educative, that results in knowing (Dewey, 1933,
p. 187). Dewey's distrust of deductive thinking was much in line with
feminism's. What accepted beliefs had passed for knowledge, in
Dewey's view, were the products of an accumulation of an authority's
past opinions and had rarely, if ever, been tested by inductive
experimental methods, or more importantly, been tested and
validated by experience.

Most knowledge, much of what one believed

to be true, if it had been tested, was done deductively, a method
Dewey described as "the only alternative to the imposition of dogma as
truth, a procedure which reduced mind to the formal act of
acquiescing in truth" (Dewey, 1916, p. 294).
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Dewey's view of generalizations and their uses has much in line
with feminism's suspicions of the phenomenon. He admits that
scientific thinking's generalities give such thinking a "technicality and
aloofness" but it is not because they are removed from practice
(Dewey, 1916, p.228). Traditional theoretical speculations, argues
Dewey, impose abstract knowledge on practice, making past
experiences the "master" of the mind (p. 225).

Generalizations are the

"counterpart" of such abstractions, clarifying and guiding experience,
providing a "wide and free survey." Generalizations derived from
scientific thinking could serve as good "social devices" precisely
because they were the results of "a wide and free survey" and not of
restrictive, dogmatic views (pp. 226-227).

For Dewey, scientific

generalization was the view of any man in a particular place and time.
Dewey's scientific method welcomed difference, or in his words,
"unlikeness." "Unlikeness" provides comparison and contrast, allowing
us to make inferences and to understand the varieties of experience.
Sameness, according to Dewey, prevents us from infering.

He writes

that when cases or objects of examination are duplicated, "we are no
better off for purposes of inference than if we had permitted our
single original fact to dictate a conclusion" (Dewey, 1933, p. 174).
Dewey certainly would have been suspicious of scientific methodology
whose only goal was repeated replication and its inference derived
only from the statistically reliable.
Dogma and beliefs originating in conceptualizations of the ideal,
were for Dewey, "crutches" which relieved us of the responsibility of
thinking and directing our actions (Dewey, 1916, p. 339). The
development of experimental methodology, or scientific thinking, gave

38

Dewey a means to achieve true knowledge, knowledge that in his view
was not opinion or "meanings supplied because of habit, prejudice, [or]
by the vogue of existing theories" (Dewey, 1933, p. 172). Because
Dewey believed that observation (experience) and thought were
interrelated, the process of thinking had to involve the discrimination
of what was experienced from what had been inferred or what had
been held as true. The experimental method gave him the vehicle to
achieve the exclusion of those judgments and conclusions which
experience/observation proved false or mistaken.

In effect, Dewey

rejects those purely empirical qualities of some scientific thinking.
Dewey viewed scientific thinking as a process which allows us to
move from facts to ideas and back again from ideas to facts (Dewey,
1933, p. 166). Such a dynamic involves the flexibility to adjust and re¬
adjust to changes in observations and experience, caused by changes
in the environment and by the passing of time. A scientific
methodology which is "purely empirical" can not, according to Dewey,
cope with the novel and, consequently, has a "tendency to lead to false
beliefs" (Dewey, 1933, p.

192). Belief which has a "purely empirical"

character is, for Dewey, the result of observation without an
understanding of connections.

Seeing a connection between the

occurrence of thunder and lightning, for example, without
understanding the why and how of the connection is a purely
empirical observation to Dewey (p. 190). A methodology rooted in
pure empiricism was characteristically post hoc to Dewey. It
suggested causality that was solely temporal and invariable. Such
fixity, argued Dewey, would effect mental passivity and the likely
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adherence to unfounded dogmatism, the result of which would be the
social crippling of individuals.
Change and the opportunity for growth are paramount in
Deweyan thought, so his dismissal of purely empirical methodology
makes sense. Change is a positive and progressive process in Deweyan
thought. To deny or prevent or control the possibilities for change
was, for Dewey, "fatal to progress" (Dewey, 1933, p. 194). Purely
empirical methodology, according to Dewey, sets down the track for
inquiry to follow, shutting out the novel or the variant. He writes:
Empirical inference follows the grooves and ruts that custom
wears and has no track to follow when the groove disappears.
(Dewey, 1933, p. 193)
Points of difference or unlikeness are therefore apt to be devalued or
dismissed. Adhering to a such an empirically laden theory of
knowledge will erase those opportunities for social change and human
growth. Prevailing authority can never be challenged under such
terms, another aspect Dewey found intolerable and which he
punctuated in How We Think:
Certain men or classes of men come to be the accepted
guardians and transmitters - instructors - of established
doctrines. To question the beliefs is to question their authority:
to accept the beliefs is evidence of loyalty to the powers that be,
a proof of good citizenship. Passivity, docility, acquiescence,
come to be primal intellectual virtues. Facts and events
presenting novelty and variety are slighted or are sheared down
till they fit into the Procrustean bed of habitual belief. Inquiry
and doubt are silenced by citation of ancient laws or a multitude
of miscellaneous and unsifted cases. This attitude of mind
generates dislike of change, and the resulting aversion to novelty
is fatal to progress. What will not fit into the established canons
is outlawed. (1933, p. 194)
It seems, then, that Dewey viewed experimental methodology as
a way of assuring intelligence as a social force. Speculations became
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hypotheses in this view and thus subject to testing by others. The idea
of reliability, that knowledge was subject to verification by others, was
for Dewey, a way of assuring intellectual responsibility and verity, its
value was not replication. Individuals engaged in knowing could
question the authenticity of accepted beliefs and in that way, make all
individuals accountable. Accepting blindly beliefs transmitted by
custom was for Dewey, intellectual inertia but most importantly,
certain to sustain an oppressive class hierarchy. Theories developed
by those who were privileged were likely to be formed by their
impressions of their worlds, by their impressions of the objects of
their observations. Theory constructed in this way would be likely to
fashion a view of reality based on a subject-object impression and not
on practice. That objects of knowledge are separate from the knower
is the centerpiece of the ideal of value-neutrality in scientific thinking.
This idea that the observer remains unchanged during, through and
after the investigation is an aspect of this type of scientific thinking
which is unacceptable for feminists as well as Dewey.
All of this suggests that Dewey's ideal democratic state would
develop without a social class hierarchy. After all, would not
intelligence guided by scientific reasoning enable us to engineer an
alliance without social class distinctions? Interestingly enough, Dewey
did not believe that a one-class social system could be the
consequence of such a democratic spirit. On the contrary, his belief
that social classes would be the result of the strength of individual
talents implies that there would be some "sorting out"’ of individuals
by virtue of their abilities. Sounding much like the Platonic "Postulates
of Specialized Natures" (Martin, 1985, p. 13), social classes in Deweys
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democracy would be the effect of the expression of individuals' talents.
These talents, all of social use, would allow the social unit to be stable,
but unlike those in Plato's Republic, would give rise to a dynamic
society (Dewey, 1916, p. 88-91). As it is in the Platonic ideal state,
Dewey's democracy requires that education, through the
implementation of the scientific method,

for the good of all, through

the implementation of the experimental method, discover, nurture
and direct individual aptitudes. Consequently, like Plato, education
will be the vehicle through which Dewey's citizens will be stratified.
But why haven't democratic societies been able to release the
individualism so necessary for Dewey's ideal? In Liberalism and Social
Action Dewey addresses this issue. For Dewey, the inability to achieve
the democratic ideal is a function of several cultural conditions in
human history: the subject-object formula of knowledge which led to
the perception of individualism as being fundamentally a-social; John
Locke's philosophy proposed that governments are created to protect
individual rights from the claims of the social unit; the view that
natural "rights" (rights to property, etc) held sovereign the individual
over the masses; the belief that government was the instrument to
secure and extend these rights; and Adam Smith's assurance that
laissez-faire liberalism would benefit both the individual and society.
What has resulted from these and extensions of these conditions is
that "the word 'social' has come to be regarded as applicable to that
which is institutionally established and which exerts authority" and,
thus, the individualistic has become a departure from the social
(Dewey, 1946, p. 295).

Consequently, that which departs from the

social must be anti-social.
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In a rather strong statement Dewey also blames the profit motive
(which he views as industrialization's traditional value) for "perverting
[the] whole idea of individualism to conform to the practices of a
pecuniary culture. It has become the source and justification of
inequalities and oppressions" (1930, pp. 15-18).

He continues in the

same text by adding that "anthropologically speaking, we are living in a
money culture" (p. 9). Cultural admiration of prestige, competition,
power and money have provided for individuals the conditions to
develop the economic individualism Dewey regarded as undemocratic.
Dewey's solution to these ills is a democratic conception of
education that widens "the area of shared concerns" and liberates the
"greater diversity of personal capacities" (Dewey, 1916, p. 87).

"What

binds people together in cooperate human pursuits and results"
(Dewey, 1916, p. 98) should be central to a democratic conception of
education.

Science and the scientific method of inquiry will allow for

the development of intelligent thought which in turn, will bring about
intelligent action. Guided by facts and not "custom, personal
convenience and resentment" (Dewey, 1922, p. 319),

scientific

inquiry activates democratic education.
In order for scientific thinking to serve as agent for the kind of
education which will bind people together in common pursuits, Dewey
must base his democratic education on concepts and beliefs which
don't set the individual's aims at odds with those of the group. How,
for example, will individuals form social classes which are not
determined economically? He must, in effect, view human nature as
characteristically social and somehow stay true to his belief in the
integrity of the individual. He must, in my mind, consider those
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concepts and beliefs inherited from a natural rights philosophy and
consider how such ideals as autonomy can be at odds with the
interdependency he values.

Like feminists, Dewey must somehow

struggle with the same tensions between autonomy and
interdependence.

If feminism is to reappropriate Dewey’s democratic

theory in order to implement the fusion of the individual and the
social, we must consider Dewey's views on autonomy and human
nature.
I began this chapter with Jean Bethke Elshtain's proposition
that feminism reflected those tensions between liberalism s
individualistic ethic common in Western thought and what Elshtain
refers to as the "republican ideals" of collective identity and shared
purposes (1986, p. 56) and ended with the proposition that perhaps
Dewey's pluralistic democracy could provide the means for resolving
these tensions. The question that remains then, is whether feminism,
in all its multiple expressions, can reclaim and utilize Deweyan
democratic theory, a theory I suggest may contain those "republican
ideals." First let's consider liberalism's dichotomization of the
individual and society, a "romantic vision" (hooks, 1984, p. 24)
wherein the "self is in opposition to the "other" and where autonomy
is valued over interdependence.
As a concept inherited from 18th century natural rights
philosophies, liberalism is truly a "romantic vision." As an ideal
developed for the affluent Western male citizenry, it posits autonomy
as a highly valued goal. A fully realized life in such a view, is the
consequence of a self-sufficient individualism characterized by a state
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of moral preparedness in which alienation and independence become
the crowning events of a life lived well.
The suggestion is that humans become fully realized only
through progressive social disassociation. This would mean that an
individual first bom into dependence, must purposely break the bonds
of sociality and ultimately live, if not physically, at least spiritually,
morally, and intellectually as an isolated being. Self-development
would somehow lead an individual from dependence to independence,
a paradigm implying a gradual shift towards the objectification of
others and towards reliance on difference as reference to Self.
Further, the need for this isolated being, one void of relational
reciprocity, to maintain self-fulfillment, suggests that this ideal
autonomy will necessarily need to control, dominate and oppress
others. What follows is the likelihood that the dehumanization of
those who for one reason or many are not allowed the right of selfgovernance, will be objectified and their realities marginalized, or
worse, negated. Control over the unautonomous will surely rely on
power.
The concept of autonomy is an issue in this consideration
because of the implications its has for interaction, experience, and
growth. If only certain individuals can be self-governing, or have the
right to be self-directive, then Dewey's sociality is impossible. A
sociality dependent on the ability of individuals to engage in multiple
and varied interactions requires that autonomy not be a right bestowed
upon some but rather, a certainty for all individuals. What is really at
issue for Dewey is an individual’s freedom to engage in the action or
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experience, or in Dewey's vernacular, to engage in those "interactions"
which give rise to intelligence.
Dewey's sociality necessarily requires the freedom to be
autonomous. It must have those "positive conditions, forming the
prevailing state of culture," which release individuals from
"oppressions and repressions" (Dewey, 1939, p. 7).

In effect, it is a

sociality which requires autonomy. In Deweyan sociality, it appears,
individuals are free to self-direct, self-govem, or, simply put, choose
for themselves.

It is the freedom of self-determination which must

characterize Dewey's "autonomy," not a right to act as one chooses. To
have the opportunity for self-determination, to be able to ascertain
what I want to do and to be able to act upon this, demands a vast and
accessible experiential world to say the least.
All this implies, of course, that the ideal of autonomy deeply
entrenched in Western liberal thought is problematic for feminists.
Feminist critiques of individualism, argues Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, are
specifically focused on individualism's emphasis on the autonomy of
the individual. She writes that:
It is to individualism that we owe the model of autonomy, which
so many feminist theorists are beginning to criticize as an
inadequate image - much less goal - of human identity. (1991,
p. 140)
But why? Why is the ideal of an autonomous, self-reliant, self¬
ruling, self-directing and unrestricted person so problematic in
feminist discourse? One can suggest that women could in theory
successfully navigate this life principle and be the autonomous ideal
beings our liberal tradition highly regards. This is the same tradition,
after all, which is rooted in the belief in the human ability to choose
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desired ends and demands that the state refrain from imposing upon
individuals universal definitions of such things as happiness, good,
health and prosperity. Why should feminists, feminists like bell hooks,
find such a notion objectionable? Does not the liberal conception of
autonomy contain some of the principles necessary for women to
claim full and free participation in their worlds? But perhaps this
vision of autonomy is part exaggerated fiction and part dark and dirty
fact.
What are these fictions and facts and what part do they play in
Dewey's notions of the individual and sociality?
Feminist theorists have de-mystified the concept of autonomy in
a variety of ways. The concept of autonomy has been linked to the
belief in the existence of a human nature. For feminists, this is an
arbitrary assumption fashioned from male models of thought,
especially those within the Greek, German idealistic and liberal
philosophical traditions, which allow women to realize their
personhood only as "conceptual men" (Snitow, 1990, p. 26). Such
theories of human nature ascribe ideals of capacities and attributes
which do not include women's experiences. As Lorraine Code
comments:
Feminists have been rightly concerned to contest the alleged
'naturalness' of many capacities and characteristics. There is no
doubt that appeals to 'human nature'...derive as much from
political interests as from straight forward observation and
description. Received theories of human nature are commonly
constructs of a privileged intellectual elite and consistently
derived from its own experiences. (1991, p. 43)
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The very idea that humans have a nature, fixed in a masculine
image and unalterable, suggests several things which are problematic
for feminists, feminist educators and John Dewey.
Feminist critiques of such theories of human nature focus on the
value of reason and its determination of social role occupancy. Those
human nature theories which exclude women and slaves from the
specific human ability to reason are part of an Aristotelian legacy
which has many implications for women in particular and humanity in
general. Woman's inability to reason necessarily limits her to certain
social roles, roles which are within the functional social castes, roles
which for her, are sex-specific. Such occupancy, argue feminists,
socialize women and men differently, re-enforcing sex-roles and
oppressive social orders (Grimshaw, 1986; Tong, 1989).

In addition,

such assignment by human type creates the kind of world where only
certain human potentialities will be expressed, ignoring other human
talents unseen or inhibited. For Dewey, who valued uniqueness and
individuality, such a conception was unacceptable.
This idea of an inevitability of our 'natures,' coupled with the
assertion that the ideals of human potentiality are masculine, has other
implications. For the feminist scholar it suggests that social roles will
be determined by capacities expressed in relation to capacities
valued. Traits highly regarded will become the reference point for all
human expressions. Those falling short of the mark will be valued
less, or minimally, classified as adjunct. A conception of a fixed human
nature where the masculine is the referential criterion is the same as
saying that sex is the determinant factor in human nature. If the most
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valued ways of being are masculine, self/mind as an isolated, selfsufficient, inorganic entity, then what are the possibilities for women?
If reason is an inherent human trait but is either absent in
women or if women are kept out of those roles in which reason is
exercised, then women will always be less worthy. Given that reason
is the most highly valued human trait and given that women perform
roles outside the realm of reason, women can not possibly be highly
regarded. Women are functional in this construction. We labor at
those tasks necessary for human survival; we are not part of what is
excellent or genuinely good. Our functional roles are devalued, so we,
too, are less than the best, less than good. We are inferior to the
superior rational man. We are mechanical and not intellectual.
Such a conception of human nature was rejected by Dewey on
similiar grounds. In Democracy and Education Dewey takes this
conception to task specifically because it separates humanity into a
"laboring" class and a "leisure" class, a distinction which segregated
educational values as well. The leisure class received a cultural
education while the laborers learned what was utilitarian. This
distinction, he argued, is not the result of something absolute or
intrinsic. Rather, it is a function of historical and social forces. Dewey
attacked the notion that rationality was a natural and complete power
in human beings primarily on the grounds that such a conception
dismissed or disregarded "the influence of habit, instinct, and
emotions, as operative factors in life" (Dewey, 1916, p. 299). In a
discussion about moral philosophies which denied the social quality of
reason, Dewey expresses his disagreement with the idea that logic or
reason can be complete because it is natural when he writes that bare
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logic [can’t] spin new subject matter out of itself' (1916, p. 299). In
his view, reason is "just the ability to bring the subject matter of prior
experience to bear to perceive the significance of the subject matter of
a new experience" (p. 343). Reason is a potential, an ability, a capacity
for Dewey.

It is neither fixed nor complete.

The division of people into such classes, argued Dewey, was part
of the Aristotelian legacy which endowed only the few with the ability
to reason, leaving the masses (in which he includes women, slaves and
artisans) to be "the means for others". As "means" women, slaves and
artisans are believed to have "enough intelligence to exercise a certain
discretion in the execution of the tasks committed to them".

For

Dewey, the idea that some are born to just live and that others are
bom to live worthily was unacceptable (Dewey, 1916, p. 252).
Given his naturalistic convictions, Dewey also had to reject the
idea that mind/self transcended the organic. This rejection and his
belief that mind emerges when the body is involved in interdependent
experiences, allows for the possibility that roles need not be
determined by a preordained set of criteria, but rather, that they
develop through experiences, relationships, and associations. He
makes this clear in Human Nature and Conduct when he rejects the
"emphasis on states of consciousness and an inner private life"
because it negates and is "at the expense of acts [all of which] have
public meaning and exact social relationships" (p.86). If this is the
case, then mind develops through action and not from a contrived
spiritual providence, an indication that women's roles in Dewey's
scheme may not be limited by virtue of their sex. For if mind must
emerge from action and not from predetermination, then anyone who
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is experiencing, acting and engaging can develop mind and
consequently, take part in chosen social roles.
The availability of choice is a key element here. Will Dewey's
women have free choice? Will they be genuinely autonomous?
Freedom to choose among alternatives, associations and
interactions is central to Dewey's entire philosophy. If individuals, in
order to develop those attributes of individuality and sociality so
important to Dewey, need the "full and free" interplay with multiple
forms of association ( Dewey, 1916, p. 83), how can choice be
arbitrarily limited? Dewey would consider such limitations "coercion"
played out in economic, psychological and moral policies. He
comments that the "very fact of exclusion from participation is a subtle
form of suppression" (Ratner, 1939, p. 401). Such suppression, it
would follow, would not allow for the full development of the individual
and the social unit. Arbitrary schemes of social action which suppress
the range of individuals' associations seem contradictory to Deweyan
goals.
Since Dewey's rejection of the view of human nature as a given
and constant is the result of his conviction that the value of individuals
can not be assessed by "some prior principle" such as "family and birth
or race and color or position of material wealth" or by "the position
and rank a person occupies in the existing social scheme" (Ratner,
1939, p. 402), we can assume that all social roles would be open to
women. Though he neglects to include sex as a "prior principle,"
Dewey believed so strongly in the potential of each human being, and
stated very clearly that oppressive social arrangements were the
results of actions taken by the autocratic and authoritarian few who
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believed that the intelligence necessary for choice was confined to a
pre-ordained group, Dewey must include sex as a "prior principle,"
even if it goes unstated. If Dewey was true to his own philosophy, he
could not ignore the reality of women's lives and experiences, and as a
supporter of suffrage, there is evidence to suggest that he was
certainly cognizant of at least one aspect of women's subordinate social
position (Dewey, 1911).
"The right to control the conduct of others" by "the preordained
few" was for Dewey, a rejection of the true meaning of freedom and
the right to equality (Ratner, 1939, p. 402), concepts which are
inextricably tied to his conceptions of the individual and sociality.
In Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in
Politics, Economy and Society Carol Gould sets out to reconstruct the
foundations of democracy arguing that liberty and social cooperation
are compatible. As the basis for her argument to "extend" democracy,
Gould rethinks the concepts of equality and freedom in a way almost
indistinguishable from Dewey's conceptualizations of each.
According to Gould, and in line with feminist thinking, the
traditional liberal theory of freedom ignores the fact that realizing
freedom requires the "enabling conditions of action," (Gould, 1988,
p. 38) setting up free choice as an abstraction. It is this abstract
quality of such an essentialist view of freedom which Gould suggests
promotes economic, social, political and psychological domination in
societies (1988, pp. 38-41). Freedom, suggests Gould, should be
interpreted as "the activity of self-development" which demands "the
availability of social and material conditions necessary for the
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achievement of purposes or plans" (1988, p. 32-33), conditions which
must include self-governance.
Gould's view of freedom as self-development is a temporal
process with a "biographical or historical dimension" (1988, p. 41).
The capacity for freedom to be realized thus involves the ability to
choose among alternatives throughout the course of a life's purposeful
actions. There's intentionality in action, an end, an objective requiring
means, and clearly, the suggestion that the process has a biography
and a history indicates that Gould's individual is as unique and as
molded by interaction as is Dewey's.
Gould also stipulates that the process of self-development is
earnestly engaged only when choice is available in practice and does
not exist solely in the abstract. As process, it must be progressive and
because it forms "new capacities" and elaborates and enriches existing
ones (1988, p. 47), it demands a wide range of real choices. Choices
in the abstract can not 'free' individuals to develop fully.
But doesn't such self-development lead to the detached,
autonomous and egotistic individualism that Gould sets out to
reconstruct?

It is Gould's contention that self-development proceeds

through participation in group projects because cooperative activity
becomes the means through which an individual can carry out aims.
Social or shared purposes allow for self-development but notes Gould,
is largely dependent on the group's members to recognize the
individual's freedom.

This "reciprocity in freedom" requires that

members consciously support others' self-development.

Such social

relations she submits, will extend and enrich "the range of possible
human actions, intentions, skills and practices" (1988, p. 50).

53

The need for cooperation and support of others for self¬
development is a fundamental part of the substance of Gould's "relation
of reciprocity." This social relation, where
each agent acts with respect to the other on the basis of shared
understanding, and a free agreement, to the effect that the
actions of one with respect to the other are equivalent to the
actions of the other with respect to the first (Gould, 1988, p. 75),
becomes the cornerstone for her views on equality and the extended
democracy she envisions, both concepts undeniably Deweyan.
Equality as Gould defines it, stems from a belief that distinctions
among individuals can't be made with regard to their potential for self¬
development (1988, p.61). Equal rights means free choice for all at all
levels of social and economic life. Access to choices in social and
economic situations is what determines equality, a view suggesting
that equality is not a value but rather, a right. As a right to social
choice, then, equality can only be seen as a political and not
metaphysical doctrine.
This is precisely the concept of equality proposed by Dewey:
All individuals are entitled to equality of treatment by law and its
administration. Each one is effected equally in quality if not
quantity by the institutions under which he lives and has an
equal right to express his judgment, although the weight of his
judgment may not be equal in amount when it enters into the
pooled result to that of others. In short, each one is equally an
individual and entitled to equal opportunity of his own
capacities, be they large or small in range. Moreover, each has
needs of his own, as significant to him as those of others are to
them....[but] each individual has something to contribute.
(Ratner, 1939, p. 403)
Dewey continues by adding that "each individual shall have the
chance and opportunity to contribute whatever he is capable of
contributing" (p. 403), and in his Ethics of Democracy states that "in
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every individual there lives an infinite and universal possibility; that of
being king and priest" (p. 25). But what is peculiar to Dewey's concept
of equality is not so much that it requires the freedom to choose
among alternatives but that choice frees intelligence which is
necessary to direct action.

It follows then that if choices are limited,

individuals will not be free to develop or that they will develop
unequally. The implications for those whose choices are restricted
seem obvious.
In both a feminist and Deweyan scheme, sociality and
individuality have common aims. This integration is supported in both
cases by a reconceptualization of freedom and equality and both
suggest that the natures of the group and of the individual are
somehow synchronized. This synchronization is what can prove to be
of educative value for feminist educational theorists. But what models
are given for such a social unit, for such a group? What are their
ideals? Both feminist and Deweyan concepts of group stress solidarity,
connectedness, common will and the integrity of the individual, but
what sets them apart is their parentage.
Dewey's fraternity is part of the triumvirate "symbols of the
highest ethical ideal" (1888, p. 23); liberty and equality are the other
thirds.

His concept of fraternity, rich in the ideals of the French

Enlightenment and Jeffersonian democracy, contained the ideals of
group association for a common purpose, interest or pleasure. But
unlike the tradition of fraternity that synthesized Kantian liberalism
and the 18th century notion of social contract, individuals in Dewey's
fraternal unions would not hold inalienable rights. As previously
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discussed, such a group would not be entitled to suppress individuals
or other groups.
Would a sororial conceptualization of group have similar
attributes? Certainly there is an element of common interests and
purposes in sorority and ideals parallel to those of a Deweyan
community. A "community of interests, shared beliefs, and goals
around which to unite," "appreciation for diversity" (hooks, 1991,
p.40) and shared pleasures are all aspects of the group dynamic
feminists call "sisterhood." But what makes one uneasy about both of
these is, as previously stated, their parentage, their sex-specific
connotation, and in the case of sorority, the possibility that its model
was fraternity.

2.4 Choosing Models of Sociality
What model for the social group can better equip Gould's and
Dewey's individual for a life of full and free self-development? What
model can provide such an individual with educative relations? The
family? Friendship?
I choose these two models, friendship and family, because each
in its own way requires associational and interactional relationships,
consequently inviting our consideration. But choosing family and
friendship as models is deliberate in yet another way. It is a choice
decided by what I perceive to be Deweyan sociality's educative value.
Deweyan sociality enables individuals to be engaged in a life of full and
free self-development, a course which is educative in the Deweyan
sense.

It is educative because the experiences promote growth in
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general, and create conditions for further personal growth (Dewey,
1938, p. 36).

This criterion directs my selection of models.

Given this, the models to be considered within Deweyan and
feminist frameworks must provide the means for positive individual
growth.

Immediately I note that the family as model becomes

problematic within our feminist frameworks. As Adrienne Rich
writes, the individual heterosexual family unit is "at the core of
patriarchy" and perpetuates many mysogynies. The division of labor by
gender, the emotional, physical and material possessiveness of
husband over wife, the economic dependency of women on men, the
subordination of wife to husband and the "imprinting and continuation
of heterosexual roles" are all part of this experience (Rich, 1976,
p. 61). Can genuine self-development be gained through such an
arrangement? Is there, within such a family unit, the possibility of
opportunities for the full and free interactions necessary for personal
growth? Is the supremacy of the husband over wife and child, for
example, a relationship whose interactions will be growth producing?
educative or miseducative? Feminist viewpoints are certainly those
which assert that the traditional heterosexual family unit abounds in
the problematic and miseducative.
The typical models for social grouping outside the feminist
tradition consider family, nation and neighborhood as appropriate
paradigms and when feminists adopt or adapt any of these, criticism is
sharp. Lorraine Code and Iris Marion Young both dismiss Sara
Ruddick's maternal thinking as a model for sociality and both agree
that positioning the family as exemplary of positive sociality a la
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Elshtain fails to realize the socio-cultural and economic implications
of such a theory (Code, 1991; Young, 1990).
Our particular discussion of feminist sociality models will not
include the example of family precisely because of what I perceive to
be the weight of these implications.

I agree with bell hooks when she

says that "feminist effort insists on the eradication of exploitation and
oppression in the family context and in all other intimate
relationships" (1989, p.22). The fact that domination and oppression
exist in family relationships is, thus, fundamentally problematic.
Though certain aspects of family life, such as the ethics of care, are
not in contradiction to feminist ethos, they are part of a socio-cultural
ethic that is the impetus for feminist revolution. Again, it is bell hooks
who notes:
Thinking speculatively about early human social
arrangement, about women and men struggling to survive in
small communities, it is likely that the parent-child relationship
with its very real imposed survival structure of dependency, of
strong and weak, of powerful and powerless, was a site for the
construction of a paradigm of domination. (1989, p. 20)
The roots of patriarchal domination and oppression run too deep in
the construction of the family. The family, I submit, in all of its
multiple forms, has too many skeletons in its patriarchal closet to be
of worthwhile use in our investigation.
Is friendship, then, a model better suited for our feminist
frameworks?
Janice Raymond writes in A Passion for Friends: Toward a
Philosophy of Female Affection, her book on female friendship, that
female friendship is the "foundation for and consequence of feminism"
(1986, p.13) and "part of the history of feminist discernment" (p. 20).
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Inspired and motivated by women’s search for meaning, female
friendship seems to be a means through which women have attained
an understanding of their circumstances and their possibilities. A
model of female friendship, then, is less problematic for our feminist
consideration.
But what does Dewey have to say about friendship? Can our
consideration include friendship in a Deweyan framework?
Dewey wrote enough about the family to validate our choice of
family as model but he wrote almost nothing about friendship. He
writes about "amiability" as a moral trait having an obvious connection
with social relationships (Dewey, 1916, p. 357), and uses friendship as
a thematic component when discussing the ideal and the real (Dewey,
1957, p. 118). What we are able to glean from Dewey's rare and
cursory mention of friendship is that individuals engaged in a
friendship have a mutual understanding of each other and require the
means for effective communication. Distance, notes Dewey, is "an
obstacle, a source of trouble for friends" because it separates them,
preventing intercourse and making contact and mutual understanding
difficult (Dewey, 1957, p. 119).
The choice of models, it appears, seems different for each
framework. What seems appropriate for feminism isn't for Dewey and
visa versa. Can this consideration examine sociality in a Deweyan
framework using the model of family and then engage in an
examination of feminist sociality through a different model? I submit
that this is a valid condition for practical reasons--Dewey wrote little
about friendship and feminisms find the family too problematic—but
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more importantly, because our requirement that educative relations be
possible can be met in each case.

2.5 Family as a Model of Sociality

"Society," asserted Dewey, is "one word, but many things"
existing in many forms, not all of which are desirable (Dewey, 1916,
p. 81). Those societies or groups, in which the members are aware of
connections between each other and are free to use the knowledge
gained from these connections to direct purposeful behavior, are
valuable. They are worthy and useful because the consequences of
such associated behavior will yield positive change, change in the form
of individual and collective growth. Such consequences are not
products of simply physical or "organic" association. Instead, they are
the results of effective communication between members (Dewey,
1929, pp. 166-167).
"Of all of our affairs," notes Dewey, "communication is the most
wonderful" (1925, p. 166).

It is the sharing of meanings between

members which leads to commonly understood meanings which, in
turn, leads to what Dewey suggests is "metaphorically" a "general will
and social consciousness" (1927, p. 153). Joint activity and
association, whether physically immediate or distant, or whether
temporally dissimilar, necessitates communication in order for the
group or community to reach desired ends. Change is possible only
through communication. Any action or event is "subject to
reconsideration and revision" (Dewey, 1929, p. 166) as a result of
participation in the exchange of meanings between individuals within
the group.

60

Sharing and communication are critical for the Deweyan
construction of sociality because it is through these that the
consequences of action can be understood, and consequently, lead to
future intelligent action. For Dewey, understanding how our actions
and the consequences of our associations affect others is vital for
sociality. We affect those with whom we are in immediate association
and we affect those outside of that face-to-face. Political boundaries,
he notes, are the result of a group's or individual's inability to
recognize and understand that the consequences of their associations
have implications for others elsewhere. It is erroneous to believe that
the consequences of association are confined or that they don't
"expand beyond those directly engaged in producing them" ( Dewey,
1927, p. 27). Association, it appears, is not a private matter in the
Deweyan framework.
Dewey made it clear that social cohesiveness could only be
brought about through communication. For Dewey, there was an
important relationship between intelligence, community and
communication.

Intelligence is the method through which we can

achieve community but it requires the sharing of thoughts, needs,
desires and concerns through language (Dewey, 1927). As he writes
in the introductory pages of Democracy and Education:
There is more than a verbal tie between the words common,
community and communication. Men live in a community in
virtue of the things which they have in common; and
communication is the way in which they come to possess things
in common. (1916, p. 4)
Thus, being aware of connections between ourselves and others,
and understanding how the consequences of actions affect others is a
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necessary part of Dewey's conceptualization of sociality. All this
suggests, of course, that Dewey's individual is engaged in associations
which will require that he be aware of the direct and indirect effects
of action, an awareness which is the result of communicating with
others. Though we are "not born members of a community," writes
Dewey, to learn to be human, is to learn to be social (1927, p. 154).
The implication here is that Dewey's sociality requires that individuals
responsibly establish an "interchange of thought and growing unity of
sympathetic feeling" (Dewey, 1976, p. 10). But one can also wonder
what this means for the integrity of the individual. Will Dewey's
individual "lose" his self as a consequence? On the contrary, writes
Dewey. Learning to be social, learning to be human is to "develop
through the give-and-take of communication an effective sense of
being an individually distinct member of a community" (1927, p. 154).
Individuality is both advanced and preserved by sociality.
This is an important element in Dewey's conceptualization of
sociality. Individuality, uniqueness, personality expressed is a
necessary component for his construction of sociality. As "intensely
distinctive beings" (Dewey, 1976, p. 22) we present ourselves through
associations. In full and free interactions between individuals, learning
results from the 'give-and-take' of shared communication, and we
begin to understand difference and its meaning, sameness and its
meaning. Since Dewey believes that it is through sharing in multiple
associations that we effectively realize our individuality, group
membership can not possibly erase individual distinctions nor blur
defined profiles. Further, by underscoring individuality's temporal and
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geographic characteristics, Dewey does not make individuals
equivocal.
Dewey's plan for education was founded on the notion that
schooling should enable us to be competent members of our social
group.

Using the model of the "ideal home" (1976, p. 23) for a

curricular guide, Dewey maintained that incorporating those aspects of
family life through which members learn cooperation, respect and
reciprocity, would make the school one with society and consequently,
its pupils competent human beings. The ideal of family life he
envisioned was characteristic of pre-industrial rural life, when the
home was the center for all activities. Due to the realities of necessity,
responsibility, obligation and all other aspects of communal life were
consciously sustained, serving to instill in individuals the moral,
emotional and intellectual attributes needed for community. Family
members became cognizant of the advantages of combined and
associated action and grew to understand the value of shared purposes.
Just participating in the everyday chores and work of the family
enables Dewey's individual to respect the ideas and rights of others
(Dewey, 1976, pp. 23-24).
Dewey makes it clear that this "ideal home" is simply that, an
ideal, and that from this he takes what is useful. What is useful for his
model for sociality is the idea that the "ideal home" is imbued with
understanding and trust.

"Well-ordered" family life is, according to

Dewey, a cooperative activity in which all members take part and
where there is mutual confidence. In such a family, "It is not the will
or desire of any one person which establishes order but the moving
spirit of the group" (Dewey, 1938, p. 54). This suggests that effective
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social groups must have these characteristics and, given his vision for
group, this seems reasonable. What the idea of the "ideal home" as
model for sociality also suggests, however, is that sociality demands
some sort of authority. After all, we can suspect that given its
prototype, Dewey's "ideal home" has an authority hierarchy where
parents rule the roost. Though Dewey doesn't characterize the "ideal
home" as the traditional hetereosexual-two-parents-some-kids
hierarchy, we can assume that he envisioned a home where someone
older, more authoritative, took command of the group.

"The parent"

in the ideal home "is intelligent enough to recognize what is best for
the child, and supply what is needed" (Dewey, 1976, p. 23), and "is
not a manifestation of merely personal will; the parent or teacher
exercises [authority! as the representative and agent of the interests of
the group as a whole" (Dewey, 1938, p. 54). Clearly, then, the ideal
home has an authority providing guidance and opportunity for growth,
and contains a power structure in many respects.
But this makes sense in Dewey’s concept of sociality. Authority,
in Deweyan terms, guides and supports individual freedoms,
consequently stabilizing the social unit (Ratner, 1939, pp. 343-344).
Such authority is not rooted in oppression and disabling control but
rather in the desire for harmony, change and continued growth within
the group. Consequently, individual group members must see the
authority figure not as a concentrated self-serving power but as a
means of support for shared group ends. One suspects, however, that
the authority—the parent—must have some pre-determined goals given
that they are wise and experienced. Though Dewey allows such goalsetting because it has the good of the group in mind, one can't help

64

but wonder how the authority attained this privileged position and
how they keep from abusing their positional power. Dewey asserts
that it is intelligence which breeds good authority and prevents such
abuse. He did acknowledge that in reality this occurs rarely, as
evidenced by the multiple societal oppressions (Ratner, 1939,
pp. 400-404) but fails to make note of the possibilities for abusive
authority in real families. But again, he was working with an ideal, an
ideal sculpted from a tradition that saw nothing wrong with a
patriarchal scheme.

2.6 Feminist Models of Community

Feminist models for community vary across theorists. Marilyn
Friedman and Iris Marion Young suggest that modem urban life can
offer insights into human sociality and serve as a "normative ideal" for
community life (Friedman, 1989; Young, 1990). Janice Raymond and
Lorraine Code propose friendship as the prototype for social
communion and in Raymond's view, female friendship as model sans
pareil.

Let's consider each idea-friendship and urban life—and examine
how each reflects or clashes with Dewey's social ideal.
Dewey would concur with Iris Marion Young's thesis that
Western traditional philosophical ideals of community fail "to offer an
appropriate alternative vision" for a democratic program. Young's
rejection, much like Dewey's, focuses on the inability of traditional
social ideals to acknowledge social differences across groups and to
recognize the difference resulting from "temporal and spatial
distancing." According to Young, group members in traditional models
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are fused in such a way that exclusion of others unlike them is likely.
She takes issue mainly with the idea that individuals will lose identity
by virtue of their membership and further, that affirming difference is
socially empowering (Young, 1990, pp. 226-227).
Young states her proposition clearly. She proposes "an ideal of
city life as a vision of social relations affirming group difference"
(1990, p. 227), affirmation without exclusion.

Social differentiation

without exclusion is the virtue of city life which Young finds most
appealing primarily because though groups may overlap and
intermingle they do not become homogeneous. City groups, she
suggests, have "borders (which) are open and undecidable" (p. 239),
the implication being that such groups allow not only for inclusion but
for the expression of individuality. This denial of uniqueness in and
across members of traditional ideals of society is what irritates Young
the most. She agrees with Foucault that the application of the ideals of
community of Western thought would lead to "a social transparency"
(Foucault, 1980), where understanding of self and others is the same
no matter the locus of perception. Such blurring of individuality
"seeks to collapse the temporal difference inherent in language and
experience into a totality that can be comprehended in one view", thus
denying the existence of difference between and across members
(Young, 1990, p. 231).
The notion of transparency or in this case, "opaqueness" is taken
up by Lorraine Code as well. Code considers the idea valid but makes
the case that it is the result of theories which present the individual
and the group in opposition. The isolation that results allows for only
a "bare recognition of difference-in-isolation, which may be tolerated.
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but requires neither understanding nor care" (Code, 1991, p. 80).

Her

indictment of the traditional ideals of community rests on their
"autonomy obsession" (p. 73), a preoccupation which has created social
marginalization, exclusion and oppression (p. 72).
Perhaps Young's urban ideal contains much of the autonomy
obsession as well. When Young presents difference as erotic, one
wonders whether such derived pleasure could be mutual. She writes
that spending a Sunday afternoon in strolling through Chinatown with
all its exotic sights, sounds and smells is pleasurable because "one is
drawn out of oneself to understand that there are other meanings,
practices, and perspectives on the city, and that one could learn or
experience something more different by interacting with them"
(Young, 1990, p. 239). The pleasure seems one-sided and voyeuristic,
however. Her affirmation of difference seems a bit self-serving. One
learns from seeing difference in Young's city, but does one exchange
the favor? Is Young's Sunday stroll through Chinatown self-indulgent
tourism at its worst? Dewey would likely think so. Without
reciprocity, without interdependence and interaction, an ideal of
community maintains autonomy paramount, something antithetical to
the Deweyan ideal.
Young also wrestles with the idea that such ideals of community
serve to objectify.

In affirming others she argues, we objectify them.

The objectification does not underscore and celebrate difference but
serves to assimilate individuals. The regard of others is always
objectifying to Young, an occurrence she insists is absent from her
ideal city life.

67

Young begins her defense of the ideal urban life by appealing to
its reality and inevitability. She is convinced that "urbanity is the
horizon of the modem, not to mention postmodern, condition"
(Young, 1990, p. 237) and, as such, the appeals to anti-urban ideals of
community will be unrealizable. It would seem, then, she would
dismiss Dewey's proposal to adopt the virtues of pre-industrial rural
life into post-industrial America.
Are Young's ideal city's virtues so different from Dewey’s
democratic vision?
On several points the two seem in congruence. Each populates
the ideal community with members who have some commonalities,
whether they be problems or interests, and each preserves the
uniqueness of the individual. Understanding others is for both Young
and Dewey not a denial of uniqueness but rather, a point of relation, of
sharing and being understood sympathetically. Each values the
individual's on-going development of self when they acknowledge and
focus on the impact of time and experience on individual lives. Both
Young and Dewey, because of their insistence on the temporal nature
of the individual, imply that fully understanding others is impossible.
But here is where the similarities end.
Young's ideal city would be problematic for Dewey because
despite the fact that groups have "some common problems and
common interests" in this city, "they don't create a community of
shared final ends, of mutual identification, and reciprocity" (Young,
1990, p. 238), Dewey's conviction that the sharing of common
purposes is central to community life certainly goes against this aspect
of Young's vision.
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But the variety of experiences and the "eroticism" of difference
inherent in Young's urban ideal is somewhat sympathetic with Dewey's
need for fuller and freer associations. There, "people witness and
appreciate cultural expressions that they do not share and do not fully
understand" (Young, 1990, p. 241), but individual differences remain
unassimilated. Young's urban ideal is much the stewpot but not quite
the idyllic melting pot Dewey would prefer.
Unlike Young's idealization of city life, Lorraine Code's vision of
friendship as model for sociality embodies a "balance between
separateness and appropriate interdependence" (Code, 1991, p.95)
and relational reciprocity. Codes goes about achieving such a balance
by reconstructing Aristotle's view of friendship so that it can be "less
culture-bound, less androcentric and misogynist" (p. 98), a criticism
she levels at theories which ideal maternal thinking and the attributes
of family.
What Code salvages from Aristotle's notion of friendship would
please John Dewey very much. First and foremost, though not unique
to our species, friendship is a human capacity. Our need to be
involved in association with others, to be social, becomes the
foundation for our ability to form bonds of friendship. Friendship
demands intelligence, or in Aristotelian language, the capacity for
reason. Friendship involves thinking not only because of the cognition
involved in choosing friends but because friendships bring to
individuals involved and varied claims:
The life of a person enmeshed in these affectionate and dutiful
demands will be more complex and ambiguous than the life of a
rule utilitarian, who can follow a single moral line. (Code, 1991,
pp. 103-104)
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The cognitive value of friendship is clear: a relationship of
reciprocity, it enables each individual to grow from the association.
Even its continuation requires knowledge. Friends are participating in
a relational process that demands continued mutual understanding. By
continuing to know each other, friends present each other with the
opportunities for growth, chances to experience and understand new
ideas, and to engage in new associations. This vision of friendship
provides us with the conditions necessary for the fuller and freer
interactions that Dewey so strongly demands. In this light, friendship
keeps the individual unique while still integrating the individual with
others. Dewey would look favorably on such a vision.
All of these models for socialities construct some vision of what
and how our lives should be. They are "visions" because they are
"ideals." Each has been fashioned as a mold for sociality, whether
derived from an ancient ideal or reconstructed from an ideal. But
there is an inherent tension in vision, a tension that reflects our need
for the tangible.
Janice Raymond asserts that this tension is not a contradictory
phenomenon, that it is not the dualistic demand for either practice or
theory, abstract or concrete, ideal or real. Rather, she believes, vision
is undivided; it is near-sightedness and far-sightedness. It is the
ability to live in the world as it is and imagining how it could be. The
"essential tension" in feminism, notes Raymond, is precisely that:
seeking to understand how we live in a world constructed by and for
men while creating a world as women imagine it could be (Raymond,
1991, p. 342). It is fitting that our final model for sociality is one
based on real experience, one in which practice informs thinking.
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Throughout the previous pages the metaphors of fact and fiction,
romance and verity, and now vision and reality, have served as a stage
for our discussion of sociality and the individual. These scripted
symbols have served as a platform for our discussion, a place where
models have metaphorically "come to life." But our final model for
sociality requires no such platform, no such drama, because it is an
established, long-standing, confirmed, durable and habituated reality.
Sisterhood and female friendship, a real and verifiable experience,
original and exemplary, will serve here as player and not as
constructed tale.
"Chosen, negotiated, achieved, not simply given" connections
between women (Martin, B., 1988, p. 96) have taken many forms
throughout time and space. Informal quilting groups, settlement
houses, women's clubs, and consciousness raising groups all exemplify
sisterhood. Though the purposes and objectives of each group varied,
it appears that the running thread throughout each of these groups,
and many others where women gathered in the absence of men, was
the desire to, and importance of, making connections with those with
whom experiences and meanings were shared. Within these
sororities, many of the constraints and obstacles to self-expression,
learning, and female relatedness which existed in women s lives were
erased. Women came together not just for individual self-renewal or
affirmation. Often, women's clubs arose out of an idea of "female
fellowship" which would "work to elevate the moral character of
society" or, as in the case of the Woman's Christian Temperance
Union, "organize virtuous womanhood so as to transform the masculine
world, to have feminine traits counterbalance men's brutal and animal
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qualities.” Their founder, Frances Willard, made it clear that the WCTU
was not out to have women compete with men, but to reform them
(Rothman, 1978, p. 64-67).
Perhaps most importantly, many women's clubs, unions and
organizations sought to provide the opportunities for women to form
and maintain female friendships where a "sense of freedom" prevailed
and where religious and political differences would not dissolve
common interests. Cultivating a "spirit of unity" among members was
central to these unions (Rothman, 1978, p. 64-66). The General
Federation of Women's Clubs founded in 1892 and Sorosis, in 1868,
served all of these purposes but their existence alone was evidence of
the value of female friendship in a reality hostile to such bonds.
What distinguishes female friendship bonds from those of
brotherhood? from those between women and men? What is it about
female friendship that makes it such a good example of effective
sociality in practice?
These questions suggest the possibility that the answers may lie
within the philosophical confines of essentialism or determinism, a
possibility which has implications for our thesis.

If we proceed from

the position that the bonds of female friendship are consequences of
an essential female nature, we will be unable to defend female
friendship as an effective model for human sociality on multiple
grounds. An essentialist posture in this case would dismiss the
possibility that female friendship attributes could (and should) be part
of all human associations, regardless of the sex of the participants.
This same posture would prevent us from maintaining the integrity of
the individual and would, I submit, engender the human transparency
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which Iris Marion Young fears. And if our point of philosophical
departure demands an essential nature that is sex specific, then
communion with the other sex can never be fulfilling, productive and
purposeful.
Lorraine Code’s criticism of such an essentialist position
addresses these very concerns.

She charges the essentialist theorist

with denying the "pitfalls of female essentialism" which entrust
women with stereotypically female traits, serving only to relegate and
confine women to roles which perpetuate their inferior social status
(Code, 1991, p. 54).

Such confinement doesn't fit comfortably within

a feminist framework such as ours. That women, all women, could
have "an essence, an inherent, natural, eternal nature" (p. 17) which
was responsible for the vitality of their friendships, is a conviction we
must disregard, if not solely on the basis of the evidence that points to
the occurrence of difference among women, then on the possibility
that essentialist dogma may invite oppression.
What we are left with is the position that feminine attributes,
and in this specific case, those attributes necessary for genuine
friendship, are socio-cultural constructions. This is the philosophical
disposition which will ground our discussion of female friendship as
living model of sociality. A biologically determined posture would
disqualify such friendship as model simply because men would
necessarily be ineligible. Feminism must, in my view, be rooted in
reality, and reality comes in two sexes.
It is from a socio-cultural constructivist perspective that Janice
Raymond develops her thesis on female friendship. In A Passion for
Friends: Toward a Philosophy of Female Affection, Raymond states
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simply that women don't have a "biological edge on the more humane
qualities of human existence" (p. 21). For Raymond, it is the
conditions and realities of women's lives which create the "social
trust" called female friendship. The attraction of women for women is
for Raymond "neither natural nor ontological" but the manifestation of
a desire to recognize relatedness in patriarchal realities. The "hetero¬
reality" of women's lives, contends Raymond, places women in social,
political and economic associations which are "ordained" by men and
are only woman-to-man associations (pp. 5-8). Relatedness and
freedom to choose relations are missing for women in such a scheme
and thus the need for female friendship. Female friendship, then,
emerges from "women's search for meaning" about herself and others
like herself (p. 20).
Female friendship's starting point is for Raymond the
"companionship of Self," the experience of knowing oneself as a
unique individual. It is a "Self which Raymond defines as an
"authentic" self which women are "recreating." It is not a self which is
"grafted" onto women by patriarchy (Raymond, 1987, p. 4). Given that
Raymond believes in a socio-cultural construction of woman, we can
take her use of the term "Self' not be be an essential self but rather, an
identity which women construct individually and which isn't
prescribed by patriarchal forces. For Raymond to say that the female
Self is "authentic" and constantly being recreated by woman, she infers
not that an essential self is present, but that a self constructed by and
for woman is possible.
It is the "affinity a woman has with her vital Self that enables
her to care about others like herself (Raymond, 1987, p. 5-6). This
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may hint at a kind of self-knowledge and appreciation that is selfserving and individualistic but I don't think that Raymond is
suggesting this at all. On the contrary, the assertion is that through a
real knowledge of Self, a meaningful knowledge, one is able to reason
and consider the Self in relation to others. The real self, discovered
through thinking, is uniquely fundamental and original, yet consonant
with others, and not obsessively self-involved (1987, p. 222). Further,
given Raymond's socio-cultural constructivist position, we can
conclude that knowing the Self is not solely the province of women,
further solidifying the case made for female friendship as the model of
genuine sociality.
To engage in positive relatedness or association, then, one must
know oneself. But given the patriarchal realities women have
experienced, how have women been able to accomplish this if at all?
Certainly women have encountered socio-culturally constructed
obstacles which prevent them from genuine Self-awareness.

How have

women scaled these barriers? Clearly, Raymond contends, women
found others like them and engaged in a shared process of Selfdiscovery.
Raymond's belief that women’s attraction for other women rests
on this very point. It is a matter of Self-survival to engage in freely
chosen association with those who share your concerns, affinities, etc.
But this relationship is not one-directional. Raymond's female
friendships are dialectical. There's an integration, a healthy dynamic
between Self and Others, between individual and group. As a "social
trust," these friendships involve "reciprocal assurances based on
honor, loyalty and affection" (Raymond, 1987, p. 9), a trust which, I
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assert, is extremely rare between women and men given our wellpracticed patriarchal ethos. That female friendships have managed to
get beyond socio-cultural barriers, or what Raymond calls the "female
state of atrocity" (1991, p. 350), is testament to the strength of the
human "longing for relatedness" (Noddings, 1984, p. 104) and selfaffirmation. Somehow, women have known that given the realities of
patriarchy, the coming together of women in the absence of men
allows for the freeing and subsequent affirmation of Self.
As "an understanding that is continually renewed [and)
revitalized" (Raymond, 1987, p. 9), female friendship demands
conditions conducive for individual and shared growth. Raymond puts
forth four such necessary conditions: thoughtfulness, passion,
worldliness and happiness.
It is through thinking that a person can discover her real Self. It
is thinking restored of thoughtfulness, however. Raymond views
thinking as theory and thoughtfulness as theory applied, theory
practiced.

Searching for meaning is thinking; thoughtfulness, injects

into thinking's rational orientation, a consideration and caring for
others and respect for their needs.

Knowledge without meaning is

useless for association. It is simply "know-how" and lacks the
thoughtful experience of knowing "why" something or someone is so
(Raymond, 1987, p. 218).
Because Raymond's female friendship begins with knowing the
Self, thinking about oneself must be a fundamental necessity of female
friendship, and such is the case. Raymond emphasizes what she calls
the "duality of thinking... that is, the duality of myself with myself ...the
one who asks and the one who answers" (1987, p. 222). In Raymond s
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view, such meaningful thinking will enable conversation with Others
because in understanding Self we understand our need for association.
Each participant in friendship conducts the same personal dialogue,
setting up the dialectical movement where being an "original Self’
and a friend simultaneously is possible. Thinking individuals, then,
maintain their integrity while at the same time, attaining group
membership through friendship.

Intelligent (thoughtful) thinking

communicated and shared will undoubtedly lead to intelligent action, a
formula which Dewey would find made-to-order.
A "thinking heart" is the manifestation of another condition, that
of passion, for Raymond's female friendship. A "thoughtful passion,"
according to Raymond, does not place thinking and passion at polar
ends.

Instead, their integration and connection allow for the positive

action that ensures the growth of both the individual and the
friendship (Raymond, 1987, pp. 223-225). To influence, to act on, to
move and impress and in turn, to be influenced by, acted upon, moved
and impressed by others, is the thoughtful Gyn/affection of female
friendships (1987, p. 8). For Raymond, friendship that is
distinguished by "thoughtful passions ensures that a friend does not
lose her Self in the heightened awareness of and attachment to
another" (p. 225).
Friendship provides a location in the public and private worlds
of our realities and this, contends Raymond, is a critical significance
for female friendship. Both a personal and political space, worldliness
seems to be the practiced intelligent, passionate action of female
friends. It is both personal and political and it must be given female
friendship's relational thinking. Engaged in association, the Self
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transcends the alleged boundaries between private and public and
acknowledges both direct and indirect consequences of association.
In a sense, Raymond's worldliness underscores Dewey’s contention
that we do not exist as solitary beings whose involvements are
inconsequential or unimportant. For women, Raymond's worldliness
introduces her Self as female Self to man-made political space and her
subsequent participation thus becomes meaningful. The worldly
woman, then, lives with integrity in the world.
But Raymond also adds that it is woman's worldliness which
enables her to maintain the feminist vision necessary to change those
aspects of the world’s realities which are unfriendly to her. This
positions the individual, in this case, woman, as agent for change,
agency which "acts with respect to the other on the basis of shared
understanding" (Gould, 1988, p.75). Such agency, allows for the fuller
development of the individual and, in turn, the social unit.
Involvement in social action does not suppress the individual, allowing
new capacities to develop and perhaps enact change. Dewey's
individual by definition must be a participant, must experience, must
be provided the opportunities for growth. "Worldliness" as it exists in
Raymond's female friendships accomplishes all of this, though
granted, does so only for women. So for Raymond's female friendship
to be truly compatible with Deweyan sociality, it must be available to
men. Though Raymond's model for sociality is sex-based, it does not
mean that its values will be unavailable to men. Let's remember that
Raymond believes that socialization has been largely responsible for,
and influential in, building female friendships.
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Striving for the integrity of Self is a process the goal of which is
to ascertain and achieve the full use of one’s powers (Raymond, 1987,
p. 238). Female friendships have historically given women the private
and public contexts in which to realize this goal, a goal Raymond
defines as "happiness." Most importantly and pertinent to our
discussion of Dewey, female friendship "provides encouragement and
environment for the full use of one's powers" (1987, p. 238).
"To find out what one is fitted to do and to secure an opportunity
to do it is the key to happiness," writes Dewey in Democracy and
Education (p. 308). For Dewey, "nothing is more tragic" than to know
what one's purposes are and then to find that one has been "forced by
circumstance into an uncongenial calling" (Dewey, 1916, p. 308). Are
not Dewey and Raymond in harmony here? In order to attain
happiness, Dewey's individual is engaged in "full and free" associations
which promise self-realization and actualization. It would appear that
the worldly environment provided women in female friendship does
the same.

2.7 Real World Problems and Our Models of Community
The idea of worldliness also needs to address the realities of
existing social difference.

If friendship is characterized by a

worldliness that positions individuals as agents for change, must
friendship bonding transcend class? Must those engaged in female
friendship believe in and accept "a re-distribution of wealth and
resources" (hooks, 1991, p. 38)? In order "to influence, to act on, to
move and impress," as those engaged in Raymond's female friendships
do, and in order to share purposes, as Deweyan friends must.
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individual economic realities, I suggest, must be considered. Can poor
women engage fully and freely in Raymond's female friendship with
the affluent? Can the affluent engage in a female friendship with the
poor? It would seem that the answers to these questions resist the
affirmative simply because inherent in the differences between
economically determined classes is the conflict of interests. And
herein lies perhaps the thorniest issue in our discussion of sociality.
In each of our models for sociality, in Young's urban ideal, in
Code's and Raymond's positions on friendship, there has been no real
attention paid to the realities of economic class differences which
exist today and have existed for much of human history. Young, for
example, does little to address the fact that one of her "multiple group
identifications" is economic class and would produce the "undesirable
political consequences of oppression and exclusion" she disdains
(Young, 1990, pp. 234-236).

Such consequences it seems, would

certainly lead to differentiation with exclusion. Though she does
admit that in reality city life in present day times can be economically
oppressive and calls for the re-organization of municipal resources, it
is the institution of city she attempts to de-class, not its citizens.
Young never makes clear how in the "unoppressive city," the citizen is
also relieved of her economic oppression.
As for Raymond's female friendships, the problem lies in the
idea of trust. Raymond's female friendships are deeply rooted in a
trust, "a social trust," which assures reciprocity based on honor and
loyalty. But as Lorraine Code reminds us:
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Trust involves making oneself vulnerable, granting other people
access to, and even control over, valued aspects of one's life,
confering on them the power as much to damage, destroy, or
misuse those things as to take care with them. (1991, p. 185)
The act of "making oneself vulnerable" to those who have economic
power over us seems precarious and down right risky, and in turn, to
"trust" those with less economic power seems in many ways, empty,
meaningless and patronizing. There’s no real tangible personal or
economic investment in "trusting" those whom one can or does
oppress. After all, by even Raymond's definition, trust can not involve
objectification nor can it be exploitive.
Under capitalism, our American economic experience, the
realities of class difference casts a shadow on each of our models for
sociality. As a system which "depends on the exploitation of
underclass groups for its survival" (hooks, 1984, p. 101), and which
places material values over human values, it is unlikely that the
economically self-sufficient would willingly give up material privilege.
Further, capitalism's economically self-sufficient individuals are likely
to be "reluctant, even unwilling" to acknowledge that any capitalist
system, sexist or not, will exploit the lower economic classes (hooks,
1984). The point is, that in any economic system where domination
occurs, it is improbable that individuals will be fully free to engage in
the shared purposes of friendship, purposes derived from establishing
a "social trust." Domination, in any form, is void of Raymond's
"thoughtfulness" and "passion" and further, doesn't allow those
oppressed to "strive for the full use of [their] powers" (Raymond,
1987, p. 238).
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If the issue of class casts such a shadow on these feminist
models for sociality, is Deweyan sociality also eclipsed by the same
knotty point?
Catherine MacKinnon begins Toward a Feminist Theory of State
by claiming that "social power shapes the way we know" and, in turn,
"the way we know shapes social power" (1989, p. IX). Since
MacKinnon's "social power" is decided by social economic order, we
can surmise that her postulate is an indictment of class. Such a
charge seems a suitable point of departure for our discussion of
Deweyan sociality and class.
It is a suitable point of departure for many reasons. If, as
MacKinnon implies, class membership determines our sphere of
knowledge and experience, then the Deweyan model for sociality,
grounded in experience based knowledge,

must either allow for full

and free interaction between classes through some uniform universal
vehicle or be without such a restrictive social order. Let's first
consider the latter condition.
Is Dewey's democratic sociality free of class stratification? Is it a
class-less society?
In Democracy and Education Dewey suggests to the reader that a
democracy in which "the free interchange of varying modes of lifeexperience is arrested," is a democracy in which there is a
"separation into a privileged and a subject-class" (1916, p. 84). For
Dewey, the implications here suggest that good democracy doesn't
separate or prevent the free exchange between classes, and that
classes are indeed a part of a good democratic framework. An
expanding mental life, or the freeing of intelligence, let's remember.

82

is central to Deweyan sociality. A democratic society which limits
inquiry and the "distribution of its conclusions" (Dewey, 1927, p. 166),
through class stratification, has lost its true democratic spirit
according to Dewey. Such class stratification, Dewey wrote, is fatal to
democracy because it is the free interaction between classes that
induces social change, a critical requirement for democracy
(Dewey, 1916, pp. 81-99). A democratized society in Dewey's view
would have different social classes but whose interchanges were full,
free and cooperative (Home, 1978, p. 112).
Dewey's vision of a sociality, where the boundaries of classes are
permeable and changing, has a loose footing in the Platonic
conceptualization of social order (Dewey, 1916, Chap. 7). Dewey
concurred with the Platonic view that society is stable only when
individuals use their aptitudes to perform functions of use to all and
also agreed with the view that it is the role of education to discover
individual aptitudes and to train individuals to put these to social use.
But the Platonic model of a three class sociality seemed unrealistic and
"superficial" to Dewey given the fact that original individual capacities
were, in his view, "indefinitely numerous and variable" (Dewey, 1916,
p. 90). Plato's three social classes suggested that only three types of
individuals could exist and that an individual could only be educated
for one specific class. In this way, Dewey recognized that the Platonic
ideal, and all of its incarnations, are static and, thus, troublesome to
him.
Dewey believed that the "utilization of the specific and variable
qualities of individuals" would allow for the change and betterment of
society, a view which placed him at odds with the Platonic. Dewey
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remarks of Plato's ideal that it had an end in view and no details
alterable, no change hoped for. This was a deductive social plan, while
Dewey, true to his definition of scientific methodology, envisioned the
inductive, where "happy accident" was not the only hope for social
improvement (Dewey, 1916, p. 91). What Dewey’s sociality demands is
a constant state of moving, progressive change fueled by the realization
of individuals' strengths and intelligences, a realization which would
guarantee the full sharing of interests and interactions between
groups. Such was not the case in Plato's ideal state. The isolation of
groups in Plato's Republic made for "the rigid and formal
institutionalizing of life" which effected the "static and selfish ideal"
(Horne, 1978, p. 107) so antithetical to Deweyan sociality.
There's no doubt that Dewey did not insist on a classless
sociality, or for that matter, that all classes become one. It's clear
from the construction of his democratic ideal that there are indeed
divisions among individuals and groups. Dewey's emphasis on the
requirement that each class have a community of interests and that all
classes must have a reciprocity of interests clearly implies that
Deweyan sociality will be class oriented in some way or another. But
just how? How are classes constructed in the Deweyan social ideal?
It appears that Dewey's social classes would develop from
individuals' realizations of their strengths. Such a society, writes
Dewey, must
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make provision for participation in its good of all its members on
equal terms and lit must] secure flexible readjustment of its
institutions through interaction of the different forms of
associated life...Such a society must have a type of education
which gives individuals a personal interest in social relationships
and control, and the habits of mind which secure social changes
without introducing disorder. (1916, p. 99)
Thus a truly democratic society must provide equal opportunities for
mental growth for all of its members, must affect institutional change,
and should promote controlled social reform.

Participation on equal

terms, changing institutions through inclusion, enlightened education
for social modification? This all sounds too much like a feminist
manifesto! Certainly Young's criteria for the urban ideal of sociality
would be met—institutional change, participation and inclusion, and
Code and Raymond would find little with which to quarrel here given
their objectives for friendship.
Given Dewey’s views on individual development and growth
(Dewey, 1916; 1938), this enlightened education to which he makes
reference in the above quotation, has a set of consequential features.
Such an education must be free and universal and focus on individual
self-development.

Achieving self-development, some would suggest,

requires control over personal activity (Bowles & Gintis, 1975, p.99).
If the realization of a truly democratic sociality requires the full and
free self-development of each individual and if the "essence" of that
self-development is, as Bowles and Gintis suggest, "the acquisition of
control over the personal activity" (1975, p. 99), then all forms of
externally imposed autocratic control must be absent from Deweyan
sociality. Controls dictated by the unequal distribution of power, for
example, must be absent from such a scheme. Power imbalances
resulting from a belief in racial or sexual inferiority must.
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consequently, be nonexistent in Deweyan sociality, and even more to
our original concern, so must the imbalance of power consequent of
the unequal distribution of wealth.
So if Deweyan social classes must be fully free to interact, and if
each individual has the opportunity to develop and engage freely in
associations purposely chosen, how then, is Deweyan sociality possible
within capitalism?
In a capitalistic sociality such as our American version,
economists Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis argue that what one
knows' is determined by class membership, which in turn, determines
how one gets this knowledge and how far one is able to take it. The
"corporate capitalism" system operating in the United States is, for
Bowles and Gintis, incompatible with Deweyan ideals of social self¬
development on many different levels (Bowles & Gintis, 1976; 1975).
First, Bowles and Gintis point out, achieving one's highest
possible personal growth is impossible for all members of society
because, in practice, American corporate capitalism does not provide
everyone with the same opportunities for self-development.

Classes

within corporate capitalism remain stratified by their economic power
(or lack of) and schooling reflects this stratification.

What one knows'

is determined by where one lives, and where one lives, is determined
by one's capital. Despite free public education, Bowles and Gintis note
that there has been little to indicate that there has been a "reduction
of class stratification and income inequality (1975, p. 106).
schooling in corporate capitalistic America reinforces class
stratification (Bowles & Gintis, 1975; 1976).

In effect,

86

Bowles and Gintis also claim that schools "by and large remain
hostile to the individual's needs for self-development" (1975,
p. 105-106), primarily because corporate capitalism has injected
business values into the educational ethos. Competition, discipline,
efficiency, control, domination and subservience, have all become a
part of the American educational objective.

Self-development as

Dewey defines it, doesn't have a chance in a system where cooperation
and mutual exchange aren't valued, where the "competitive either/or
thinking" rooted in a self-serving individualism is reinforced (hooks,
1984, p. 29), and where the quality of the classroom experience is
judged not by individual growth, but by standardized norm referenced
tests.
Both of these criticisms of Deweyan sociality are valid only if we
accept Bowles and Gintis' premise that the applied objectives of the
Progressive educational movement and John Dewey's democratic
educational goals are one and the same. Though Dewey certainly
influenced much of the Progressive educational agenda, he was critical
of several principles central to the movement and did not believe
himself to be a Progressive (Dewey, 1938).
The Progressive educational movement's insistence on the
pupil's freedom to develop naturally troubled Dewey because it
neglected to recognize the importance of the curriculum. Such an
emphasis on the pupil at the expense of subject matter was far from
what Dewey had envisioned. For Dewey, the point was not to choose
the child over the curriculum but to bring the two together. In
addition, Dewey insisted that neither the traditional education nor the
Progressive or "new" education was adequate. What was needed in
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Dewey’s view, was a theory of experience which did not "condition"
students, nor did it leave them to their own devices (Dewey, 1938).
Experience and Education specifically addresses Dewey's criticisms of
both the Traditionalists in education and the then new Progressives.
Bowles and Gintis' main criticism of the Progressive movement
and John Dewey rests on their belief that "the failure of progressive
educational reforms" is the result of the incompatibility or
"contradictory nature of expanded reproduction, equality of
opportunity, and self-development in a society whose economic life is
governed by the institutions of corporate capitalism" (1975, p. 118).
What Bowles and Gintis fail to realize, however, is that John Dewey's
educational democracy and the realized Progressive agenda were not
one and the same, and that, in reality, Dewey also saw the same
contradictions.
Dewey blamed the embracing of laissez-faire liberalism in the
United States for the "intellectual justification of the status quo"
(Dewey, 1937, p. 33). Laissez-faire capitalism was, in his view, socially
enslaving because it allowed "economic relations to become
dominantly controlling forces", preventing the majority from realizing
their potentialities. The "effective liberty of thought and action" so
important to Dewey, he judged impossible in such a state (1937,
p. 34). In his view, the state, by definition, was a shared intelligence
and a sharing of purposes. Government, as an organ of the state, did
not "originate the moral claims of the individuals but should "protect
all forms [and] promote all modes of human association in which the
moral claims of the members of society are embodied and which serve
as the means of voluntary self-realization" (1937, p. 25). Thus, the
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state is responsible for establishing institutions under which
individuals can effectively realize their potentialities.

Government

should be controlled by the social state and not visa versa. That
American government could allow a laissez-faire attitude to prevail and
dictate the affairs of the state must have seemed, for Dewey, an unruly
tail wagging the dog.
Dewey's proposal of a "constructive synthesis" for social action
was based on his belief in the power and "logic of freed intelligence as
a social force." Freed intelligence, in Dewey's view, would create an
organized social plan where "industry and finance are socially
directed" and which in turn, would provide "the material basis for the
cultural liberation and growth of individuals" (Dewey, 1937, p. 55). It
appears, then, that both maintaining the integrity and importance of
the individual and establishing material security is a prerequisite for
Dewey's social objectives.
In the latter years of the American economic Depression, Dewey
addressed these two points in several of his writings, two of which,
"What I Believe, Revised" (1938) and "The Economic Basis of the New
Society" (1937) are particularly relevant to the criticisms launched at
Dewey by Bowles and Gintis.
Dewey used "What I Believe, Revised" to stress that "individuals
are the finally decisive factors of the nature and movement of
associated life" and that when free to choose and decide among
political institutions, will achieve the "genuine individuality" so socially
liberatory. The dangers to the primacy of the individual, argued
Dewey, are present in the extreme shifts of political emphases he
described as "the decline of democracy, or the flourishing of laissez-
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faire corporate capitalism, and the "rise of the totalitarian states." Each
polarity, he argued, rendered the individual powerless, making true
social good an impossibility. Though political opposites, "capitalistic
collectivism in industry and finance" and "state" capitalism are "two
sides of one and the same indivisible picture" (Dewey, 1938, p. 32). In
both, Dewey's individual has little opportunity, if any, for genuine
expression. True to form, the Deweyan remedy for these political ills
suggests a balance between extremes in which the state, the collective
arrangement of individuals, controls its institutions.
Dewey's prescription begins with an admitted vagueness:
The answer in general is that political activity can, first and
foremost, engage in aggressive maintenance of the civil liberties
of free speech, free publication, and assemblage. In the second
place, government can do much to encourage and promote in a
positive way the growth of a great variety of voluntary co¬
operative undertakings. (Dewey, 1938, p. 38)
The details of his instruction involve:
the abolition or drastic modification of a good many institutions
that now have political support, since they stand in the way of
effective voluntary association for social ends. (Dewey, 1938,
p. 33)
To Dewey, these institutions were: "tariffs and other monopoly
furthering devices;" the system of land tenure with discounted
taxation on behalf of private profit; the politically protected long-term
capital investment which, in Dewey's view, directly taxed the
"productive work of others;" and finally, government promotion of
product scarcity, whether for private profit in the case of state
capitalism, or for "public relief in a socialist state (Dewey, 1938,
p. 33).
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The way to strike this balance and rid the state of such
institutions, is to make possible alliances of voluntarily cooperating
individuals. Whether the result of state legislated dictate or through
an empowered group's awareness, such alliances serve as examples of
the effectiveness of associated and cooperative sociality. Socialized
medicine, in Dewey's view, is a good example of a "socially useful,
productive activity" which epitomizes the nature of the "functional
socialism" he professed to value (Dewey, 1938, p. 34).
A year after Dewey had made a sketch of his "functional
socialism" in "What I Believe, Revised," he explained his thesis in
greater detail. As a general reaction to the status of the individual in
the world and a specific criticism of unemployment, Dewey's "The
Economic Basis of the New Society" aimed more directly at what he
viewed as the failures of American social order. What generates most
of the failures, he suggested, is "the fact that we have had production
and distribution organized on a non-social basis - a basis of pecuniary
profit," a system which makes it impossible to address the public's
needs, and which ignores human potential (Dewey, 1939, p. 420). In
the same article, he argues for the implementation of the minimum
wage, the building of affordable housing and universal health insurance.
But more to the issue of the "modification" or "abolition" of anti social
institutions, Dewey demands a profit sharing, cooperative management
system in industry as an essential element for an "intelligent program
of social reorganization:"
[There is] the need of securing greater industrial autonomy, that
is to say, greater ability on the part of the workers in any
particular trade or occupation to control that industry, instead of
working under conditions of external control where they have
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no interest, no insight into what they are doing, and no social
outlook upon the consequences and meaning of what they are
doing. This means an increasing share given to the laborer, to
the wage earner, in controlling the conditions of his own
activity. (Dewey, 1939, p. 422)
It appears, then, that Dewey's criticism of American
economically determined social order has much in common with
Bowles and Gintis'. Equality of opportunity and self-development are
contradictory to what Bowles and Gintis call "expanded reproduction,"
a term, I suggest, is synonymous to Dewey's "collective capitalism."
Both "expanded reproduction" and "collective capitalism" aspire to the
same end, private profit and both achieve it through the same means,
the economic oppression of the worker.

Dewey certainly does

maintain that material security must be a prerequisite for achieving
self-development.

"The failure of our social order" to ensure

individuals "steady and useful employment," undermines morale,
demoralizes, undermines self-confidence and self-respect and "the
faith or belief in the world and in others" (Dewey, 1939, p. 417). But
more to the point, Dewey's economic remedies for our social ills have
never been appreciably employed. Further, Bowles and Gintis'
suggestion that Progressive/Deweyan educational ethos failed to
recognize the fact that without economic restructuring, their
objectives would be unattainable, is erroneous not only in equating
Dewey with Progressivism, but also in missing the fact that Dewey, too,
felt that such an equation would put "the social cart before the social
horse" (Dewey, 1939, p. 429).
To dwell too long on the fact that many of Dewey's critics "failed"
to recognize this or that in Dewey's philosophy serves our query only
so much. Certainly, making note of, and examining the bases of
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criticisms provides us the springboard for investigation. The
investigation, in turn, becomes a process which enables us to see for
ourselves, to judge for ourselves, to make note of our perspectives. We
are thinking for ourselves when we investigate the roots of criticism, a
practice undeniably liberating, an exercise which makes
reconsideration and reclamation possible. That being so, what have
we considered, what can feminist scholarship reclaim as a result of
this investigation of Dewey's notions of individuality and sociality?
As a reflection of the "tensions between individualism and the
common good, between rights and sociality, between romantic visions
and rationalistic orderings, between equality and difference" (Elshtain,
1986, p. 56), feminisms confront constructed epistemic dichotomies
unsympathetic to their purposes. The nature of the confrontation
begins with the idea that reality is dualistically ordered, and
ultimately, rests on the thorny implication that sex, the primary
dualism, is the difference that matters. Reclaiming John Dewey s
work must consequently involve the consideration of dualism, of how
he addresses these tensions, or for that matter, consider if they even
exist in his philosophy. And this is precisely what our investigation
has attempted to do.
The individual and the common good are not at odds in Deweyan
thought. They are not polarizations, they are not opposites without a
continuum in between. Though distinct entities, they constitute an
integrated life. The interests of the individual and the interests of
groups are reconcilable in Deweyan thought, a fact which serves to
relieve this particular "tension" for feminists.
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Even Dewey's notion of class serves to present feminism with a
social alternative to a stratification based on inequality and difference.
Dewey's "classes" are social constructions, not economic
constructions. He stays true to his definition of "social." His "social
classes" are only those associations of multiple individuals who share
multiple interests and purposes. They are not classified by economic
status, by race or sex. An individual, as a point in a circle of
association, intersects with multiple and varied circles of association.
As we, women and men, interact with each other, we are interacting
with all those other points, all those other individuals on each circle of
association. What interests we have in common, what purposes we
share determine the intersection.
Can we ever be completely excluded from any point of
intersection? Dewey would argue that because there is no essential
human nature other than our need to be social, we should all be able to
intersect, to meet, to engage each other, even if only briefly or to a
small degree, with every circle of association.

It follows then, that

women, in a Deweyan framework, can not be considered a class simply
because we are not all uniformly the same, because we do not all share
an essential nature. We may form social classes in the Deweyan sense
because of shared purposes and aims, but not because we are women.
If our examination has revealed anything, it has underscored the
importance of the uniqueness of the individual and the absence of an
essentialist posture in Deweyan thought. This, above all, serves to
relieve dualistic tensions in many feminisms. Without the presence of
dualistic thought rooted in essentialism, Deweyan thought becomes
congenial and accessible to feminists, ultimately making each
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conversive to the other. What it brings to those feminist movements
with essentialist leanings is perhaps the possibility that despite
women's and men's "essential" differences, fruitful interactions are
possible. After all, if indeed a sexually essential nature does exist, is
there any guarantee that each and every expression of our unique
individualities will be shared by someone of the same sex? I doubt it.
As a feminist who struggles with the tensions of categorizations
within feminism, I find that John Dewey's notions of sociality and
individuality provide me with useful considerations and possibilities.
It's not really important that our investigation suggest that Dewey
could gain membership in a particular brand of feminism. Yes,
Dewey's construction of class aligns him with feminist theorists whose
vision is of an egalitarian sociality. In ways, Dewey's dislike for
corporate capitalism is in line with Marxist Feminist claims that
capitalism is the root of all oppressions. Perhaps even Socialist
Feminism, where both economic and gender factors are responsible
for class oppression would find Dewey pleasant company. But what is
especially valuable is that we have found in Dewey a past which can
deepen and extend our understanding of our present, and most
importantly, assist us in shaping a feminist future.
To some, Dewey's belief in the ability of humans to find shared
purposes and to acknowledge commonalities may seem solely a
"romantic," an impractical and unrealistic vision. I suggest that
through a feminist lens, it is optimism and hope which give shape to
Dewey's romantic vision, not caprice.

In optimism and hope there

exists the possibility for change, and that possibility, is for this
feminist, too important to ignore.

CHAPTER 3
SEEING, THE HAZARDS OF OUTLOOK AND CONCLUSION

3.1 Seeing
'To believe that the world is only as you think it is, is stupid," he
said. "The world is a mysterious place. Especially in the
twilight." (Castaneda, 1972, p. 64)
Carlos Castaneda learns through his apprenticeship with don
Juan Matus, a Yaqui Indian sorcerer, that in order to really "see" the
world, he must "stop" it, he must do more than "look" at it. It is
through "seeing" the motionless world that Castaneda is able to "break
the dogmatic certainty...that the validity of [his] perceptions, or reality
of [his] world, is not to be questioned" (Castaneda, 1972, p. xiv). A
feminist consideration does much the same thing.
It is a similar journey in which I have engaged us. The questions
we have asked of John Dewey's philosophy have given us the
opportunity to "stop" and "see" through our feminist lenses, the pale,
dim and shadowy "twilight" that Dewey had sketched so many years
ago. The purpose of our journey, I've insisted, is not to decide
feminism's place in Deweyan thought, but rather to consider Deweyan
thought's place in feminism. We searched for the valuable in John
Dewey's educational theory. We "stopped" his philosophy and then
considered, or perhaps even re-considered, what we saw.
What have we seen?
We 'forgave' John Dewey's failure to place women at the center
of his philosophical focus, but can we ignore the absence of gender in
his philosophical and educational treatises? Did Dewey consider
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bodies to be gendered? If Dewey s ideal democratic education is
grounded in the "necessary relation between the processes of actual
experience and education" (Dewey, 1938, p. 20), what role do
women’s and girls' experiences play in schooling and how does he
assess their worth?
In 1911, as part on an on-going series aimed at considering the
issues which ”touch[ed] the interests of women and the family life,"
The Ladies’ Home Journal published John Dewey's article "Is CoEducation Injurious to Girls?" It is in this article that Dewey peels
back the layers of his educational convictions to reveal his estimation
of women, their capacities, potentialities, character and place in
education.
What Dewey reveals in The Ladies' Home Journal narrative,
together with his ideas on the nature of humans, suggests that he
believed that the differences between the sexes were the
consequences of both biology and culture. For example, at the same
time that he credits the idea of "weak and dependent femininity" as an
ideal for girls and women to 18th century "sentimentalism," he talks
about "natures" and "instincts" unique to the sex. Dewey equips girls
with "feeling instincts" and "ultra-feminine weaknesses" which can be
"worked out," "steadied, clarified and purged" through the proper
environment (Dewey, 1911, pp. 22, 60-61).
The "proper environment" Dewey advocates is the co¬
educational school. His portrait of boys' behavior suggests that boys
also have traits peculiar to their sex. But what is important to note,
however, is that Dewey seems to imply that though the influences of
association positively affect both sexes, boys' "natural attraction to
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girls makes them live-up to their best potentialities, while girls’
association with boys can lead them only to traits more "functional"
and masculine (Dewey, 1911, p. 22). One of the inferences, then, is
that though both sexes grow through the influences of association, the
ideals of growth are masculine. Dewey also claims in this commentary
that boys' associations with girls make them mannerly, courteous and
civil, and that girls' associations with boys make them more
productive. It appears then that since masculine traits are valued, and
since 'production' is a masculine trait, then the successful citizens of
Dewey's democracy must be engaged in 'production' oriented lives.
What form 'production' assumes in Dewey's democracy is of
consequence for feminists.
Dewey stipulates that the co-educational environment provides
the opportunities for attaining effective social ends.

In Dewey's mind,

"the significant tasks of society - remedial and constructive "will be
carried out by both sexes. Thus a co-educational environment will
supply the conditions necessary for both sexes to grow as individuals
in a democracy. To become better individuals, co-operation between
the sexes becomes a necessary enterprise, one which Dewey viewed as
an "intellectual and moral necessity in a democracy." What is
problematic for feminism in this conceptualization is Dewey's
emphasis on the "importance of right family life for all social ends"
(Dewey, 1911, pp. 60-61).
Though Dewey acknowledges that "the part of women in
industry outside the home" could possibly increase and that women
could be given the right to vote, his insistence on the great value of
the "right family life" and that "as wife the woman is in relation to a
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man," makes one suspect that woman's role in his democracy is
limited. Even as participants in higher education, Dewey entrusts
women to the co-educational universities because they alone can give
women the "scientific preparation for the responsibilities of
parenthood and household management." Women’s colleges' curricula,
he notes, only prepare women for the vocations (Dewey, 1911, p. 62).
Dewey seemed to want women to be schooled in the same ways that
men were schooled.

In a letter Dewey writes to William Rainey Harper

dated 16 January 1902, he makes the argument for coeducation at the
University of Chicago by saying that the "proper basis of the relation of
the sexes [is] the serious pursuit of truth in mutual competition and
cooperation" (Gordon, 1990, p. 115).

Dewey seems to suggest that

women's exclusion from men's intellectual worlds devalued women in
some way.
It seems then that women, though certainly capable of entering
the "vocations," must also play a specific role in order to complete the
"right family life." Is Dewey relegating women to particular roles
within the ideals of the "right family life?" Dewey may value family
because he sees it as a social necessity, but he sees it as containing
sex-specific roles. Is he suggesting that women enlist in what
Adrienne Rich describes as "institutionalized motherhood" (Rich,
1976)? Do all women have those "feminine instincts" necessary for
the "right family life" to be guaranteed? Is Dewey suggesting that
there is a "maternal" instinct in all women? Can women be both
vocational and motherly?
Inherent in all of these questions that surround Dewey s
judgment of the "right family life," of "natures" and "instincts unique
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to each sex is the hint of a biological determinism which is
problematic for many feminists, as it should be for Dewey himself. If
biology is the infrastructure of experience, then social roles must
logically be sex-determined and specific.

Consequently, it becomes

important to understand what Dewey insinuates when he refers to
"instincts," "natures" and "tendencies."
In Human Nature and Conduct Dewey considers what he terms
"The Psychology of Conduct." Within this chapter he unravels his
theory of "impulses and instincts." As original, unlearned activity,
instincts are merely interests whose meanings are acquired.
Dependent on interaction with social media, an instinct or
"phenomena" is expressed as a result of reactions to variable and
multiple stimuli.

"Native tendencies," Dewey notes, are complex,

active "realities" and not singular or "separate psychic forces or
impulses" (Dewey, 1939, p. 90). What Dewey is suggesting is that
behaviors, responses to socialization, are not the results of a peculiar,
biologically determined source. Instead, they are an "accumulation of
stresses" which when effected "evoke reactions of favor and disfavor"
(Dewey, 1939, p. 151).
As "realities" which are the result of responses to multiple
interactions with the environment, Dewey's instincts can be neither
natural nor inevitable. He defends this contention by pointing out that
because humans are biologically consistent, only socialization can be
the cause of the "great diversity of institutions and moral codes."
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When we recognize the diversity of native activities and the
varied ways in which they are modified through interactions
with one another in response to different conditions, we are able
to understand moral phenomena otherwise baffling. (Dewey,
1939, p. 156)
But in order to negate the assumption that human beings are
biologically predisposed to certain behaviors, Dewey must reveal the
falsity of the assumption. He does this by stressing that the whole
organism is involved in interaction and that reactions to associations
are not a singular inborn feature. For example, when one is afraid, it is
not that "fear," a singular, native tendency, is released but rather, that
the whole organism is reacting to associations. No two reactions, no
two fears are the same, Dewey adds. Fear of the dark is different from
fear of the dentist, which is different from the fear of ghosts, and so
on. But each is "qualitatively unique" because it is the result of "its
total interactions or correlations with other acts with the environing
medium, with consequences" (Dewey, 1939, p. 155).
Given this view, would social roles in Dewey's democracy be sexdetermined and sex-specific? It's true that Dewey's view of instinct
would assure that social roles be determined by sex if the governing
mode of socialization is sex-biased and/or sex-based, but could the
case be otherwise in a Deweyan educational democracy? Will sex still
be a difference that makes a difference?
In discussing instincts Dewey uses "maternal love" as an example
of conduct inappropriately believed to be a pre-determined, singular,
psychic force. If we understand Dewey correctly, such a native
tendency is the result of environmental consequences, not the result
of a fixed nature. How and when and by whom "maternal love is
exhibited, is the net effect of the organism in time. The whole of
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"maternal love" is the compilation of reactions to interactions with
ever-changing, ever-modifying environments.

If women are those

whose "maternal love" tendencies or interests are encouraged,
fostered and rewarded, they will undoubtedly be the sex assigned the
"mothering" role. Should Dewey's democracy sanction such
socialization, sex will clearly determine social roles.
But Dewey suggests that sex may indeed be the biological
difference that makes no difference when he considers woman's
sexual desire as "instinct." He dismisses the psychoanalytic view of
women’s sexual desire on the grounds that it "transform[s] social
results into psychic causes".
Writers, usually male, hold forth a psychology of woman, as if it
were dealing with a Platonic universal entity, although they
habitually treat men as individuals, vaiying with structure and
environment. They treat phenomena which are peculiarly
symptoms of the civilization of the West at the present time as if
they were the necessary effects of fixed native impulses of
human nature. (Dewey, 1939, p. 153)
He goes on to discredit the anti-feminist notion of Libido as an
"original psychic force," believing that social conditions, not biology,
have determined such "libidinal" dispositions (Dewey, 1939, p. 154).
Thus it appears that given sexism-free socialization, women in
Dewey's democracy are eligible for all roles. But given the reality of a
Western culture steeped in sexism, what roles can women play in a
real-life Deweyan democracy? If feminism is to consider Deweyan
education as a philosophical vehicle, this question becomes very
critical. From his early 20th century comments in The Ladies' Home
Journal, it would seem that those roles Dewey finds necessary for
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democracy will limit women’s experiences.

Does Dewey ever expand

his notions of women's roles and experiences?
In 1930, Dewey reinforces his philosophy based on "experience
as the sole authority in knowledge and conduct" in his essay "What I
Believe." In it, he stresses the importance of change in human
existence, change which affects the many meanings and purposes of
human existences, change which brings about individual growth. He
writes:
It is assumed, in spite of evident flux in the actual situation, that
the institutions of marriage and family that developed in
medieval Europe are the last and unchanging word. (Dewey,
1950, p. 26)
He goes on to add:
it is clear that the codes which still nominally prevail are the
result of one-sided and restricted conditions. Present ideas of
love, marriage and the family are almost exclusively masculine
constructions. Like all idealizations of human interests that
express a dominantly one-sided experience, they are romantic
in theory...The realities of the relationships of men, women, and
children to one another have been merged in this fusion of
sentimentalism and legalism. The growing freedom of women
can hardly have any other outcome than the production of more
realistic and more human morals. (Dewey, 1950, p. 29)
Though he never explicitly addresses the value of women s
experiences per se, Dewey comments on the uses of play and work in
the curriculum in such a way that one gets the impression that
women's traditional roles and experiences are not "arresting," but
"liberalizing."
Dewey's "active occupations" contain a "liberalizing quality"
(Dewey, 1916, p. 199) making them educationally significant. Their
significance lies in the fact that they are occupations which "tap
instincts at a deep level" (p. 200) and which "typify social situations'
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(p. 199).

Gardening, cooking, sewing, weaving, painting, drawing,

singing and dramatization are a few of the "active occupations" which,
when employed in the curriculum, appeal to students and introduce
qualities and skills transferable to other contexts. Growth through
involvement in these occupations is inevitable.
It appears, then, that Dewey valued many of the occupations' in
which women have been traditionally engaged, but one can venture to
say that their value to Dewey lies in their "productive" virtue and not in
their association with women.

Dewey finds significance in these

"occupations" because they "typify social situations" and thus
"[approximating] the ends which appeal in daily experience" (p. 198).
Their purposes satisfy needs Dewey labels "human."
Men's fundamental common concerns center about food,
shelter, clothing, household furnishings, and the appliances
connected with production, exchange, and consumption.
Representing both the necessities of life and the adornments
with which the necessities have been clothed, they tap instincts
at a deep level; they are saturated with facts and principles
having a social quality. (1916, p. 199-200)
Though feminists would agree that the need for food, shelter
and clothing are part of women's experiences, it's likely that the
dispositions of the "instincts" Dewey's "occupations" tap are masculine.
Instead of "production, exchange and consumption," why not
"reproduction, sharing and cultivation"? The nurturing qualities
necessary for child-rearing and teaching appear absent from these
"occupations." Has Dewey ignored those occupations which are not
"production" oriented?

Has he ignored the reproductive processes

Jane Roland Martin defines as conception, birth, child rearing.
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tending the sick, caring for family needs, and running the household
(Martin, 1985, p. 6)? It seems that such is the case.
Though feminists would not classify the reproductive processes
as "active occupations," its absence from Deweyan thought is both
conspicuous and incriminating to a degree. When the reproductive
processes of society are deleted, and the productive processes
emphasized, women's experience is devalued. As Martin comments:
Viewing education as preparation for carrying out societal roles,
[philosophers] tie their proposals to some vision of the good
society. (Martin, 1985, pp. 5-6)
Dewey's "good society," practical and free of the ills of "private profit"
(p. 201), appears to require an education solely emphasizing the
practical, utilitarian human endeavors largely carried out by men.
Even when he does comment specifically on the reproductive
processes, Dewey's focus is on the sensible and the functional.
Take, for example, the issue of birth control. In 1932, Dewey is
one of several prominent figures asked to submit to The Nation
commentary on the birth control movement. In his essay he calls for
the removal of the "arbitrary restrictions" of the law and cultural
sentimentality which forbid birth control education. Educating
individuals on methods of birth control assures Dewey that the
"intelligent control" of the reproductive processes will be exercised,
resulting in a "supreme" quality of life. Families with "too many
children and those badly spaced" can not provide for children the
opportunities necessary for physical, moral and intellectual growth.
Dewey's concern is not that birth control will grant women "intelligent
control" over "blind natural processes." His uneasiness is with the
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actuality that quantity is in this case, impractical. Is Dewey saying, in
effect, that what is practical is what is valued? It appears that this is
the case.
What is a feminist educator's response to this? The first
question that emerges relates to the idea of social efficiency. If the
goal of our teaching is to shape social policy, and social policy is
characterized by efficiency, what are the implications for subject
matter? for entire curricula? for method? for the social roles our
students occupy now and those for which they are schooled?
If we hold social efficiency and utility as educational goals highly
valued, are girls and women at risk of being schooled for those roles in
which we can be truly functional? Will both men and women be
educated for those roles to which they are particularly suited? What
characteristic, what aspect of their personhood will determine their
roles? And what does this mean in Deweyan terms?
In an Artistotelian tradition this means that we would educate
girls and women to enter those roles that best fit their natures
because it is from their true natures that education follows:
Both children and women must be educated with an eye to the
constitution. (The Politics, Book I, Chapter XIII, p. 97)
The "constitution" for Aristotle is first determined by sex, the primary
distinction of nature. Dewey, on the other hand, believed that we
discover a person's nature, a discovery whose aim is not the
identification of some absolute, fixed and complete essence. On the
contrary, human nature should be understood in terms of a
progression and movement through time, a course that is always in
relation to other people and things. Consequently, Dewey could not
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suggest that we deduce our educational aims from the idea of a fixed
universal human nature and could not take girls’ and women's natures
as a given. He had to acknowledge socialization in the make-up of
natures. In his article on co-education for example, he does so. Those
traits traditionally considered part of the female nature, such as
dependence and weakness, he attributes to the social context of the
18th Century (Dewey, 1911; 1950).
This seems to suggest that Dewey did not view sex as the
primary distinction of human nature but there remains the thorny
point of sex and social efficiency and utility. From what we read in "Is
Co-education Injurious to Girls?" it appears that the best education for
women is that which will enable us to assume "the responsibilities of
parenthood and household management" (1911, p. 62),
responsibilities which Dewey views as part of an efficient social
scheme. Women will run their households with scientific efficiency,
let's remember. But why can’t men do they same? If they, too, are
schooled in the scientific method, could not the "house husband" be as
efficient as the "house wife"? Probably not, because despite the fact
that boys can learn to be mannerly, courteous and civil, traits which
we can submit may be necessary in running a household, there
remains the question of reproduction.
Bearing and begetting children are necessary social roles but
whose realities are a sticking point in this consideration of Deweyan
thought. If Dewey wants what is best for the group, what is best for his
ideal democracy, then men's and women's best potentialities must
find an opportunity for expression. Does he consider the ability to
bear children a potentiality? Does he neglect the obvious distinction
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between men and women, the reality that one sex must be the child
bearer?
This consideration has not given us a clear answer to these
questions perhaps because Dewey's writings are characteristically
ambiguous. Morton White notes in Social Thought in America: The
Revolt Against Formalism that Dewey waffles between rejecting
formalism and being a social engineer. He writes:
By refusing to formulate ends of social behavior for fear of being
saddled with fixed ends, Dewey hardly encouraged systematic
political engineering. (1952, p. 244)
The failure to articulate specific means and ends in education and its
repercussions is perhaps the most useful thing that feminist
educational theorists can learn from Dewey and choose not to
reappropriate, choose not to repeat.
As feminist educational theorists, refusing or neglecting to
"formulate ends of social behavior for fear of being saddled with fixed
ends" (White, 1952, p. 244), we run the risk of enacting no lasting
social change. Feminist educational theorists can't waffle for this very
reason. We can be social critics, a position which Dewey chose for
himself (Randall, 1939, p. 91), but we can not fail to articulate clearly
our specific guidelines for social change. Unlike Dewey, we can not
just trace the contours of curricula (Hofstadter, 1962, p. 375), we
must list in detail curricular content and clearly define and describe
our teaching methods. When we reappropriate Dewey's concepts of
the individual and sociality and use them as the basis for our curricula
and our methods, we teach women and men to consciously assess and
understand their membership in society, an act which some of
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Dewey's critics noted that humans just don't do (Flew, 1977,
pp. 90-92). But this is something we want our sons and daughters to
do. To get them to do so requires, that as feminist educators, we
admit partisanship. It demands that we engage in the political act of
feminist teaching and not just feminist educational theorizing. It
demands that we become practicing social engineers.

3.2 The Hazards of Outlook
The world that the feminist educational theorist sees is a world
that demands change and action. But what if we commit the same
mistake that Castaneda initially makes on his journey? What if we
don't "stop" Dewey's philosophy? What if we only "look" at it?
If we only "look" and not "see," we could be blinded by the
hazards of our outlooks. All outlooks, all ways of viewing the world,
can exclude, whether knowingly or inadvertently, or unintentionally,
dismiss the possibility of consideration. Our "ideologies," our
"frameworks" can prevent us from considering some "mysteries,"
something long ago said, or thought or written about. Our lenses
become rigid, constant and steadily focused, which fixes our
perspective, which in turn, fixes us, the viewers, as well. Given its
tradition of inclusion, it is unlikely that feminism would be too
susceptible to these hazards, but it is precisely because feminism has
an ethic of inclusion that it can ill afford to ignore these dangers.
As a feminist educational theorist, I would now like to consider
just a few of these hazards.
First, there is the danger of dismissing or ignoring the valuable
in other philosophical traditions. This particular investigation has
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been an exercise in reappropriating the valuable from a tradition
viewed outside, or at the very least, different from, feminist
mainstream thought. We have sought to understand what, if anything,
Deweyan thought could offer a feminist educational agenda and
discovered that indeed, several Deweyan tenets could be
reappropriated.

Had we ignored Dewey, had we dismissed his theory

as part of a tradition unsympathetic to feminist goals, we would have
lost the opportunity to incorporate and expand Dewey's notions of
sociality and the individual in our educational scheme, and
consequently, been ideologically weaker. In Liberalism and Social
Action Dewey warns that old habits and ways of thinking must be
remade by the "new and disturbing." But here is a case where we look
to the past to help guide, support and stimulate a "new and disturbing"
force called feminism (1935, p. 49).
Some may balk at the very idea that a radical position such as
feminism could take away anything of value from Dewey, or from a past
typically antipathetic to feminist aims. But let us see what this
dismissal would mean.
In essence, dismissing Dewey without investigation would be
contradictory to feminism's belief in the value of experience.
Converting past experience into useful knowledge for particular action
is an integral part of feminist knowing. The use of autobiography and
biography in feminist education, for example, epitomizes the value
feminists place on past experience for present knowledge and future
action. It is part of the feminist framework of knowing. Present and
future action refers to past experience as a source of context for
hypothesis testing. We look to experience to provide us with that

no
all-important personal context which enables us to devise and revise
our theories and practices. Often, feminist scholarship transforms the
past by discovering or re-discovering those voices silenced because of
their sex or race or class. This is, itself, a reappropriation of
experience that seeks to transform and modify the past because of a
present day need. This is not to say, however, that we limit our vision.
On the contrary, past experience, or traditional ideology, should be
transcended in order to enact purposeful change.
What I am also suggesting is that, in a way, for the feminist
educational theorist to blindly dismiss Dewey because of his place in
history is logically inconsistent. Valuing past experience means just
that. The past, when reappropriated by the new, can provide us with
relevant wisdom. We may decide that the value of past experience or
thinking is that we find it contradictory to our needs. Very well then,
but we have indeed referred to it in order to structure and direct our
present and future actions. In effect, we have valued past experience.
Let's consider one last case in point: bell hook's idea that radical
feminist pedagogy is a political act and Dewey's belief in teachers and
schools as agents for social change.
In many ways, feminist agendas are revolutionary, and as such,
they must go beyond prevailing thought. Successful revolutions, it
seems to me, are those which eclipse reigning opinions and beliefs,
and as a result, take hold. If they do not transcend the object of their
displeasure, they remain movements, never really transforming
ideology.
Dewey defined education as a social process and the school as its
principal agent for change. The school, in Dewey's view, should be
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that institution which eliminates "the unworthy features of the existing
environment from influence upon mental habitudes" and in so doing,
transmits that which will "make for a better future society" (Dewey,
1916, p. 20). It should be active in engineering social change and
shaping social structures. Schools and teachers, in Dewey's view, must
stay connected to the realties of the world; neither can be isolated so
that students are not also isolated. Dewey charges teachers with the
task of keeping students aware of the conditions, values and forces in a
changing world. This, he says quite plainly, is the educator's "calling"
(Ratner, 1939, pp. 695-696).

Hence, teachers and educational

institutions can't really be value neutral. A teacher's philosophy, then,
will be practiced.
Because there is no "spontaneous germination in the mental
life," teaching, in Dewey's view, involves suggestion and guidance,
sharing of experiences and participation in learning activities (Dewey,
1929, p. 37). Teachers must leave behind the idea that subject-matter
and that knowing are ready-made and outside of the student's
experience.

Instead, it is the responsibility of the teacher to know

enough about her students and their needs in order to direct their
inquiry. And the kind of guiding and directing that Dewey suggests is
specifically purposeful. Dewey wants teachers to be those "leaders in
social work" which give students the opportunity to engage in critical
and investigative thinking, an activity which truly "frees the individual
(Dewey, 1923, p. 517). His fear is that if teachers don't provide the
guidance, the suggestion or direction, students will develop their
knowledge and values from hearsay, innuendo or casual
recommendation.

He writes that if the student does not get the
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suggestion from the teacher, he gets it from somebody or something
in the home or in the street" and goes on to purport that this
suggestion is likely to lead to a superficial understanding of an event, a
people, a phenomenon, etc (1929, p. 37).

Dewey wants teachers to

guide the process of "sympathetic and discriminating knowledge of
what has been done in the past and how it has been done" (Dewey,
1929, p. 40). Though he doesn't, and can't, deny the value of these out
of school experiences, he clearly felt that only teachers could give
students the opportunity to make intelligent sense of their worlds.
Dewey's insistence on the social responsibility of teachers is
rooted in his belief that it is "sympathetic and discriminating
knowledge" which frees individuals socially, economically and
intellectually. Sympathy, not empathy, for what was the way of life in
the past, enables thinking individuals to move beyond the habits of
past or present social orders, and partake in present and future
multiple and varied associations. Individuals guided by teachers
through inquiry, will learn to take intelligent action within multiple
spheres of interactions (Dewey, 1916, p. 301). Teachers become the
hand assisting the individual towards self-realization and in doing so,
become the vehicles through which a social philosophy can been
actualized and not remain theory.
Characteristic of her candid, "no punches pulled" scholarship,
bell hooks' treatise on radical feminist pedagogy is not abstract, and it
is definite in its shape and form. It is a pedagogy which has
"transformative power," a power which arms students with critical
consciousness and enables them to resist and rebel against the
oppressions of sexism and racism. Because students’ worlds are not
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neutral, because students, as individuals, are attached to real worlds,
they confront ideas which may not make personal sense. It is one of
the goals of this radical feminist teaching to provide students with an
arena for their "crisis of meaning." Students need a place where they
can make critical sense of things. Their studies, then, must provide
them with that "dialectical context" through which personal meanings
can be attained (hooks, 1989, pp. 50-51).
hooks' feminist teachers are, like Dewey's educators, engaged in
social work. Theirs is "a true calling, a true vocation," a responsibility
with political implications (hooks, 1989, p. 50). Their work is
admittedly the union of a practice and a theory which seeks to change
social ethos and order. The feminist classroom is one in which,
according to hooks, teachers accompany their students through their
process of critical thinking, keeping them "attached"

to their worlds.

As individuals, students in our feminist classrooms are not "abstract,
isolated, independent, and unattached to the world" (hooks, 1989,
p. 52). To deny this is to suppress their critical consciousness and
ultimately, deny them their freedom.
The radical feminist teacher must, in hooks' view, apply those
pedagogical tools consistent with a feminist ethic.

Feminist teachers

must know individual student’s needs. Who feels at risk in the
classroom? Who needs more, or less, of an opportunity for personal
confession? hooks reasons that as feminist teachers, we can not
transform consciousness if we do not know our students' intellectual
or psychic conditions. We must talk to our students about our
pedagogical strategies. Will I take attendance? How will I appraise
your class participation? Teacher and student are mutually engaged in
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this learning relationship, a relationship which seeks to empower
both.
Like Dewey's educational techniques, the feminist pedagogical
tools hooks recommends have as their basis, the value of personal
experience.

In her teaching, hooks uses personal confession and

autobiography to bring to the subject matter, students’ experiences.
She does this for many reasons. When much of human experience is
theorized, especially those of women and ethnic and racial minorities
in the United States, confession and memory serve to validate
students as individuals in a real world. It places students in multiple
contexts and not in reference to, nor makes them solely the objects
of, the dominant culture.

Most importantly, given their feminist

grounding, these techniques politicize personal experience.

Students’

identities in context, are reinforced as real, appropriate, essential,
significant and of great consequence.
Can hooks' notion of pedagogical revolution eclipse Dewey's? As
stated previously, it seems that successful revolutions eclipse reigning
opinions and beliefs. Does hooks' radical feminist pedagogy have the
necessary elements for success?
What we see very easily is that hooks dramatically and purposely
takes a political position, while Dewey leaves us without a specific
political agenda, hooks' pedagogical position is clear, and though as a
result of intense investigation we can submit that Dewey’s pedagogy
had political implications, we can’t really say that he made explicit,
any particular political objective. Dewey's desire for social change, if
we recall, was not characteristically civic or political. We know that
hooks' revolution is seeking feminist ends, but can we say that Dewey
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had this or that specific political end in mind? hooks' pedagogical
foundation is feminism, an explicitly political condition. Dewey’s
pedagogical grounding, on the other hand, is his ethic of democracy, a
virtue or conscience lacking a partisan conviction.
The power to change the social world which Dewey confers on
teachers is in a way, the result of Dewey's dismissal of external forces.
Now, he doesn't and can't negate out-of-school experience and
influences. But by saying that the external, out-of-school influences
are alleviated and righted by teachers, he insinuates that life’s
contextual realities are awkward, or at least problematic to the pursuit
of real knowing and learning, hooks, on the other hand, realizes and
acknowledges the power of the worlds external to our classrooms and
takes a firmer, more radical, more definitive stance. Teachers, in
hooks' mind, can influence, can guide, but they invite the outside
realities into the classroom. It is only through this inclusion that
hooks reasons teachers can match the strength of patriarchal worlds.
It is almost as if hooks arms teachers more effectively, hooks knows
that in order to have real "transformative power" in our worlds,
teachers must resist, confront, rebel, and must do so blatantly.
Dewey makes his teachers a bit too passive for any real effect to
be felt. Yes, Dewey's pedagogical stance is subversive but it is not
forceful, nor is it insistent, hooks' teachers, on the other hand, lead a
public and unshrouded charge.
So here we see after some consideration that though we can
reappropriate some of Dewey's pedagogical theory, we must be aware
that it can only take us so far towards our feminist educational aims.
Had we reappropriated Dewey's "wait-and-see," gradual and passive
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pedagogical posture, we would most likely find ourselves living the
same fate as Dewey: never really taking hold, never really changing
society. This fate. I'll submit, is not a feminist desired end. It was
through "stopping" and "seeing" Dewey that we were able to consider
what is valuable to our cause, and what we can do without. We did not
dismiss the valuable solely because of the aspects we deemed
worthless.
But what if, in our efforts to be truly revolutionary, we harden
our theory and practice, becoming rigid and unresponsive?
The obvious matter is that the social world is in a state of flux,
and... we go on teaching as if the Constitution and our forefathers
had finally determined all important social and political
questions (Ratner, 1939, p. 690)
There is the need for change and flexibility in our educational
theory and practice. For educators, the message is that a fixed
pedagogical ethos freezes the status quo in time, and in doing so,
preserves it beyond its usefulness. The absence of change and
flexibility in pedagogy has a limiting effect and herein lies our second
hazard.
Maintaining a rigid pedagogical posture preserves tradition
which can ultimately limit our students personally, intellectually,
socially. Theory must be flexible if it is to respond to our changing
needs and consciousness. Just as hooks advises the feminist educator
to reassess pedagogical tools with each new group of students, so must
the theory grounding her practice adjust.
This is not to say, however, that as feminist educational theorists
we should allow our pedagogy to be co-opted or lose its fundamental
conscience. We should view ambiguity and doubt within our theory or

117

approaching our theory, as an opportunity for inquiry and growth. We
should not stiffen our theory, outlook, or the scope of our vision, for
fear of losing theoretical integrity. We lose nothing when we engage in
critical consideration and inquiry. If we genuinely care about our
theory and our practice, we will welcome those opportunities to
explore and expand. If we engage in an open and free exchange of
ideas, our pedagogy stands ready to move forward. A pedagogy
resistant to change and dispositionally recalcitrant will surely fall prey
to the dangers of rigidity.
Especially for feminist pedagogy, the prospect of rigidity is
problematic. If the primary value of feminist pedagogy is that it can
empower us all, boys and girls, women and men, and if our educational
aims are to better understand ourselves, our humanity and our
experiences, then feminist educational theory and practice can not
determine its boundaries. We should view feminist pedagogy as
developmentally infinite. Whether as theorists we stay engaged in a
conversation or critical inquiry with mainstream theories, or we
consider new and yet uncharted theoretical terrain, we, because we
are our theory, will stand ready for positive, progressive change.
Armed with the tools of critical inquiry and consideration, ours will
not be an ill-fated experiment.

3.3 Conclusion
He pointed to the dark valley in the distance. "If you don't feel
that it is your time yet, don't keep your appointment," he went
on. "Nothing is gained by forcing the issue. If you want to
survive you must be crystal clear and deadly sure of yourself."
(Castaneda, 1972, p. 268)
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The end of Carlos Castaneda's journey turns out to be the
beginning. From Don Juan he learns that he has to be "deadly sure of
(him)self' before he can stop the world and learn to see. The lesson
for us, I imagine, is the same. Are we, as feminist educational
theorists, "deadly sure" that our theory and its foundation are secure
enough to engage in critical dialogue and consideration with
mainstream epistemology? We stand to be changed by this particular
journey. Can we confidently begin this journey? Or will we discover,
as Castaneda does, that it is not time yet, that we are not ready to keep
our appointment?
I'll answer these questions in this way: If feminism requires that
we fully understand and identify the distortions of androcentric
epistemologies, then we have no choice but to learn how to see that
world more clearly. If feminism is itself a way of asking questions,
then we must be ready to ask those questions of all ideologies by
confidently taking part in journeys of critical consideration. If a focus
of feminism is every person’s self-development, then as a living theory,
it too, must grow and evolve. Unlike Castaneda, feminism can not
decline the invitation to a journey to "see" the world. What we see will
challenge feminism. But how else will we learn to ask significant
questions and suggest new and far-reaching directions? We must
begin somewhere.
If we are to be truly revolutionary with our teaching, I believe
that we must instill in our students and our colleagues, the value of
shared purposes, the worth of interdependency. This feminist
consideration of John Dewey's concepts of the individual and sociality
suggests that we begin with a reappropriation of these concepts.

I
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submit, that by reappropriating Dewey’s concepts of the individual and
sociality and using them as feminist pedagogical anchors, we can take
possession of the cognitive powers of interdependence.

Further, as

we have seen through our consideration of models of sociality, it is
through a feminist model of friendship that we can begin to achieve
that interdependence.

Engaged in such friendships is engagement in

full and free interactions and in affective relations. Through these
interactions, I believe, we become better able to broaden and heighten
our intellectual abilities. In effect, friendship becomes both the means
and aim of our feminist education. It is through friendship then, that
we can engage in good feminist education.
Mujeres, a no dejar que el peligro del viaje y la inmensidad del
territorio nos asuste - a mirar hacia adelante y a abrir paso en el
monte (Women, let's not the danger of the journey and the
vastness of the territory scare us - let's look forward and open
paths in these woods). (Moraga & Anzaldua, 1983, p. v.)

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Agonito, R. (1979). History of Ideas on Women. New York: Norton.
Archambault, R. D. (1966). Philosophical Bases of the Experience
Curriculum. In R.D. Archambault (Ed.), Dewey on Education,
Appraisals (pp. 172-180). New York: Random House.
Arendt, H. (1958). The Human Condition. Chicago: The University
Press.
Aristotle. (1980). [The Politics.] (T.A. Sinclair, Ed. and trans.). England:
Penguin.
Barrett, W. (1979). The Illusion of Technique: A Search for Meaning in
a Technological Civilization. New York: Anchor Books.
Belenky, M. F., Clinchy, B. M., Goldberger, N. R., & Tarule, J. M.
(1986). Women's Wavs of Knowing:The Development of Self,
Voice and Mind. New York: Basic Books, Inc.
Bordo, S. R. (1987). The Flight to Objectivity: Essays on Cartesianism
and Culture. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Bourne, R. (1964). War and the Intellectuals. New York: Harper & Row.
Bowles, S. & Gintis, H. (1975). The Contradictions of Liberal
Educational Reform. In W. Feinberg & H. Rosemont (Eds.),
Work, Technology and Education: Dissenting Essays in the
Intellectual Foundations of American Education (pp. 92-141).
Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Bowles, S. & Gintis, H. (1976). Schooling in Capitalist America. New
York: Basic Books.
Callan, E. (1981). Education for Democracy: Dewey s Illiberal
Philosophy of Education. Educational Theory, 31(2), 167-175.
Cassell, J. (1977). A Group Called Women. Illinois: Wavelend Press.
Castro, G. (1990). American Feminism. New York: New York University
Press.
Chodorow, N. (1979). The Reproduction of Mothering. Berkeley: UC
Press.
Cocks, J. (1989). The Oppositional Imagination: Feminism, Critique
and Political Theory. London: Routledge.

120

121
Code, L. (1991). What Can She Know? Feminist Theory and the
Construction of Knowledge. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Cohen, S. M. (Ed.). (1977). New Studies in the Philosophy of John
Dewey. Hanover: University Press of New England.
Cremin, L. A. (1961). The Transformation of the School:
Progressivism in American Education, 1876 - 1957. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf.
Daly, M. (1984). Pure Lust: Elemental Feminist Philosophy. Boston:
Beacon Press.
Damico, A. J. (1978). Individuality and Community: The Social and
Poltical Thought of John Dewey. Tallahassee: University of
Florida Press.
Dewey, J. (1885). Education and the Health of Women, Science VI,
343-344.
Dewey, J. (1888). The Ethics of Democracy. University of Michigan
Philosophical Papers: Andrews and Co.
Dewey, J. (1905). The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism. Journal of
Philosophy, 2x 393-399.
Dewey, J. (1906). Reality as Experience. Journal of Philosophy, 3,
253-257.
Dewey, J. (1907). Pure Experience as Reality: A Disclaimer.
Philosophical Review, 16, 419-422.
Dewey, J. & Tufts, J. H. (1908). Ethics. New York: Henry Holt & Co.
Dewey, J. (1910) The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other
Essays in Contemporary Thought. New York: Henry Holt & Co.
Dewey, J. (1911). Is Co-education Injurious to Girls?. Ladies Home
Journal, 28(22), 60-61.
Dewey, J. (1911). Symposium on Women's Suffrage. International, 3A
93-94.
Dewey, J. (1916) Democracy and Education. New York: Macmillan
Publishing Co.
Dewey, J. (1922) Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to
Social Psychology. New York: Henry Holt & Co.

122
Dewey, J. (1923) The School as a Means of Developing a Social
Consciousness and Social Ideals in Children. Journal of Social
Forces, 1, 513-517.
Dewey, J. (1925). Experience and Nature. Chicago: The Open Court
Publishing Co.
Dewey, J. (1927). The Public and Its Problems. New York: Henry Holt
& Co.
Dewey, J., Barnes, A. C., Buermeyer, L., Munro, T., Guillame, P.,
Mullen, M., & de Mazia, V. (1929). Art and Education: A
Collection of Essays. Pennsylvania: The Barnes Foundation.
Dewey, J. (1929). Characters and Events: Popular Essays in Social and
Practical Philosophy. New York: Henry Holt & Co.
Dewey, J. (1930) Individualism, Old and New. New York: Minton,
Balch and Co.
Dewey, J. (1931) Philosophy and Civilization. New York: Minton, Balch
& Co.
Dewey, J. (1932). Education and Birth Control. Nation, 134(3473),
112-113.
Dewey, J. (1933). How We Think. New York: D.C. Heath & Co.
Dewey, J. (1935). Liberalism and Social Action. New York: G.P.
Putnam's Sons.
Dewey, J. (1937). Authority and Social Change. Harvard Tercentenary
Publications. Authority and the Individual, Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Dewey, J. (1937). Democracy and Educational Administration. School
and Society, 45(11620), 457-462.
Dewey, J. (1937). Education and Social Change. The Social Frontier, 3,
235-238.
Dewey, J. (1938). Experience and Education. New York: Macmillan.
Dewey, J. (1938). Logic. The Theory of Inquiry. New York: Henry Holt
& Co.
Dewey, J. (1939). Freedom and Culture. New York: G.P. Putnam s Sons.

123
Dewey, J. (1946). Problems of Men. New York: Philosophical Library,
Inc.
Dewey, J. (1950). What I Believe. In G. Kennedy (Ed.), Pragmatism and
American Culture (pp. 23-31). Boston: D.C.Heath.
Dewey, J. (1950). What I Believe, Revised. In G. Kennedy (Ed.),
Pragmatism and American Culture (pp. 31-35). Boston: D.C.
Heath.
Dewey, J. (1957). Reconstruction in Philosophy. Boston: Beacon Press.
Dewey, J. (1960). On Experience, Nature and Freedom. New York:
Liberal Arts Press.
Dewey, J. (1963). Philosophy, Psychology and Social Practice. New
York: G.P. Putnam's Sons.
Dewey, J. (1967). The Early Works, 1882-1898. Carbondale: Southern
Illinois University Press.
Dewey, J. (1976). The School and Society. Carbondale: Southern
Illinois University Press.
Dewey, J. (1985). Context and Thought. In Boydston, J. (Ed.), John
Dewey: The Latter Works, 1925-1953. Carbondale: Southern
Illinois University Press, 6(1931-1932), 3-21.
Dietz, M. (1985). Citizenship with a Feminist Face: The Probelms with
Maternal Thinking. Political Theory, 13(1), 19-37.
Donovan, J. (1985) Feminist Theory: The Intellectual Traditions of
American Feminism. New York: Frederick Unger Publishing.
DuBois, E. C., Kelly, G. P., Kennedy, E. L., Korsmeyer, C. W., &
Robinson, L. S. 119871. Feminist Scholarship: Kindling in the
Groves of Academe. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Duran, J. (1990). Toward a Feminist Epistemology. Santa Barbara:
Rowan & Littlefield.
Dykhuizen, G. (1973). The Life and Mind of John Dewey. Carbondale:
Southern Illinois University Press.
Eisenstein, Z. (1981). The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism. New
York: Longman Press.
Elshtain, J. B. (1981). Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social
and Political Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

124

Elshtain, J. B. (1986). Meditations on Modern Political Thought:
Masculine/Feminine Themes from Luther to Arendt. New York:
Praeger Publishers.
Faderman, L. (1981). Surpassing the Love of Men. New York: William
Morrow & Co.
Feinberg, W. & Rosemont, H. Training for the Welfare State. In W.
Feinberg & H. Rosemont (Eds.). (1975). Work. Technology and
Education: Dissenting Essays in the Intellectual Foundations of
American Education. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
A Feminist Dictionary. (1985). Boston: Pandora Press.
Flax, J. Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory. In
L.J. Nicholson (Ed.). (1989). Feminism/Postmodernism. New
York: Routledge.
Flew, A. (1977). Democracy and Education. In R.S. Peters (Ed.) John
Dewey Reconsidered (pp. 76-123). London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul.
Foucault, M. (1978). The History of Sexuality. New York: Random
House.
Foucault, M. (1980). Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other
Writings, 1972-1977. C. Gordon (Ed.). New York: Pantheon.
Fox-Genovese, E. (1991). Feminism Without Illusions: A Critique of
Individualism. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina.
Freire, P. (1972). Pedagogy of the Oppressed. England: Penguin Books.
Friedman, M. (1988). Feminism and Modem Friendship: Dislocating
Community. Ethics, 99, 275-290.
Frye, M. (1983). The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory.
New York: Crossing Press.
Gergen, M. M., (Ed.). (1988). Feminist Thought and the Structure of
Knowledge. New York: N.Y.U. Press.
Gilligan, C. (1982). In A Different Voice: Psychological Theory and
Women's Development. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Gilman, C. P. (1979). Herland. New York: Pantheon Books.

125
Gordon, L. D. (1990). Gender and Higher Education in the Progressive
Era. New Hampshire: Yale University Press.
Gould, C. (1978). Marx's Social Ontology: Individuality and Community
in Marx’s Theory of Social Reality. Massachusetts:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
Gould, C. (1988). Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social
Cooperation in Politics, Economy and Society. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Gouldner, H. & Strong, M. S. (1987). Speaking of Friendship: Middle
Class Women and Their Friends. New York: Greenwood Press.
Griffiths, M. & Whitford, M. (Eds.). (1988). Feminist Perspectives in
Philosophy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Grimshaw, J. (1986). Philosophy and Feminist Thinking. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
Gunew, S. (Ed.). (1991). A Reader in Feminist Knowledge. London:
Routledge.
Harding, S. & Hintikka, M. (Eds.). (1983). Discovering Reality:
Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics,
Methodology, and Philosophy of Science. Boston: D. Reider.
Harstock, N. (1981). Fundamental Feminism: Process and Perspective.
Building Feminist Theory: Essays from Quest, a Feminist
Quarterly (pp. 32-37). New York: Longman.
Heldke, L. (1989). John Dewey and Evelyn Fox Keller: A Shared
Epistemological Tradition. In N. Tuana (Ed.). Feminism and
Science (pp. 104-115). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Hofstadter, R. (1962). Anti-intellectualism in American Life. New York:
Vintage Books.
Hook, S. (1950) John Dewey: Philosopher of Science and Freedom.
New York: Dial Press.
hooks, b. (1984). Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center. Boston:
South End Press.
hooks, b. (1989). Talking Back: Thinking Feminist, Thinking Black.
Boston: South End Press.
Home, H. H. (1978). The Democratic Philosophy of Education.
Connecticut: Greenwood Press.

126

Johnston, J. (1973). Lesbian Nation: The Feminist Solution. New York:
Simon & Schuster.
Keller, E. F. (1985). Reflections on Gender and Science. New Haven:
Yale University Press.
Keller, E. F. & Hirsch, M. (Eds.). (1990). Conflicts in Feminism. New
York: Rutledge.
Kennedy, Gail (Ed.). (1950). Pragmatism and American Culture.
Boston: D.C. Heath and Co.
Kersey, S. N. (1981). Classics in the Education of Girls and Women.
New Jersey: Scarecrow Press.
Lewis, M. & Simon, R. (1986). A Discourse Not Intended For Her:
Learning and Teaching Within Patriarchy. Harvard Educational
Review, 56, 457-472 .
Lorde, A. (1984). Sister Outsider. New York: Crossing Press.
Lugones, M. C. & Spelman, E. V. (1983). Have We Got A Theory For
You! Feminist Theory, Cultural Imperialism and the Demand for
'Woman's Voice". Women's International Forum, 6(6), 573-581.
Maher, F. (1985). Pedagogies for the Gender-Balanced Classroom.
Journal of Thought, 20, 48-64.
Mahar. F. (1985). Classroom Pedagogy and the New Scholarship on
Women. In Culley, M. & Portugues, C. (Eds.). Gendered
Subjects: The Dynamics of Feminist Teaching (pp. 29-48).
Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Mahowold, M. B. (Ed.). (1984). Philosophy of Women: Classical to
Current Topics. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Martin, B. (1988). Lesbian Identity and Autobiographical Difference(s).
In B. Brodski & C. Schenck (Eds.). Life/Lines: Theorizing
Women’s Autobiography. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Martin, J.R. (1985). Reclaiming A Conversation: The Ideal of the
Educated Woman. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Mason, R. E. (1960). Educational Ideals in American Society.
Pittsburgh: Allyn & Bacon, Inc.
McCanney, M. G. (Ed.) (1982). Feminst Thought and the Structure.of
Knowledge. New York: New York University Press.

127

McElroy, W. (Ed.) (1982). Freedom, Feminism and the State: An
Overview of Individualistic Feminism. Washington, DC: Cato
Institute.
McMillan, C. (1982). Women, Reason and Nature. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Minh-ha, T. T. (1989). Woman, Native, Other. Bloomington, Indiana
University Press.
Moraga, C. & Anzaldua, G. (Eds.). (1983). This Bridge Called My Back:
Writings by Radical Women of Color. New York: Kitchen Table:
Women of Color Press.
Morgenbesaer, S. (Ed.). (1977). Dewey and His Critics. New York:
Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
Noddings, N. (1984). Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and
Moral Education. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Okin, S. (1979). Women in Western Political Thought. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Osborne, M. L. (1979). Women in Western Thought. New York:
Random House.
Outlook. (1990). 84(4). 1-6.
Peters, R. S. (1977). John Dewey Reconsidered. London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul.
Phelan, S. (1989). Identity Politics: Lesbian Feminism and the Limits
of Community. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Professor for Suffrage. New York Times. 9 August 1912, 3.
Randall, J. H. Jr. (1939). Dewey's Interpretation of the History of
Philosophy. In P.A. Schlipp (Ed.) The Philosophy of John
Dewey, New York: Tudor Publishing Co.
Randour, M. L. (1987). Women's Psvche, Women's Spirit: The Reality
of Relationships. New York: Columbia Press.
Rankin, W. M. (1913). Friendship. In J. Hastings (Ed.) Encyclopedia of
Religion and Ethics, 6, 131-138.
Ratner, J. (Ed.). (1939). Intelligence in the Modem World: John
Dewey's Philosophy. New York: Random House.

*

128

Raymond, J. G. (1986). A Passion for Friends: Toward a Philosophy of
Female Affection. Boston: Beacon Press.
Raymond, J. G. (1991) The Visonary Task: Two Sights-Seeing. In S.
Gunew. A Reader in Feminist Knowledge (pp. 342-351).
London: Routledge.
Rich, A. (1976). Of Woman Bom: Motherhood as Experience and
Institution. New York: Norton & Co.
Rothman, S. M. (1978). Woman's Proper Place: A History of Changing
Ideals and Practices, 1870 to the Present. New York: Basic
Books.
Scheffler, I. (Ed.). (1966). Philosophy and Education. Boston: Allyn &
Bacon, Inc.
Schultz, F. M. (1969). Intelligence and Community as Concepts in the
Philosophy of John Dewey: A Response to Walter Feinberg.
Educational Theory. 19(3), 236-248.
Seigfried, C. H. (1991). Where Are All the Pragmatist Feminists?
Hypatia, 6(2), 1-20.
Snitow, A. (1990). A Gender Diary. In M. Hirsch & E. Fox-Keller (Eds.).
Conflicts in Feminism (pp. 1-43). New York: Routledge.
Somjee, A. H. (1968). The Political Theory of John Dewey. New York:
Teachers College Press.
Spender, D. (1985). For the Record: The Making and Meaning of
Feminist Knowledge. London: The Women's Press.
Stanley, L. & Wise, S. (1983). Breaking Out: Feminist Consciousness
and Feminist Research. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Tong, R. (1989). Feminist Thought: A Comprehensive Introduction.
Boulder: Westview Press.
Treichler, P. & Kramarae, C. (Eds.). (1987). Theory and Practice in
Feminist Scholarship. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Watt, J. (1989). Individualism and Educational Theory. Boston: Kluwer
Academic Publishers.
White, M. G. (1952). Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against
Formalism. New York: The Viking Press.

129
Winer, L. (1981) Staging for Consciousness-Raising. In Chinoy, H.K. &
Jenkins, L.W. (Eds.). Women in American Theatre
(pp. 301-307). New York: Crown Publishers.
Young, I. M. (1990). The Ideal Community and the Politics of
Difference. In L. Nicholson (Ed.). Feminism/Postmodernism
(pp. 300-323). New York: Routledge.
Young, I. M. (1990). Justice and the Politics of Difference. New Jersey:
Princeton University Press.

